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ABSTRACT 
Pursuant to its obligations to the international community, 
the United States provides asylum to individuals fleeing persecution 
“on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion.” For decades, both the Board of 
Immigration Appeals and federal courts recognized that individuals 
could obtain asylum based on a fear of persecution at the hands of 
nonstate actors, so long as the applicant demonstrated that their 
government was “unable or unwilling” to control the persecution. 
As part of a wide-ranging attack on asylum, the Trump 
administration has sought to eliminate asylum based on nonstate 
actor persecution. In June 2018, the Attorney General (“AG”) issued a 
sweeping decision, Matter of A-B-, vacating a 2014 decision in which 
the Board of Immigration Appeals had held that those fearing 
domestic violence could obtain asylum relief. Among other things, the 
decision heightened the nonstate actor standard, requiring that 
applicants not only show that their governments were “unwilling or 
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unable” to control the persecution, but also that the governments 
“condoned” or were “completely helpless” to stop the persecution. 
After Matter of A-B- was decided, federal courts have 
disagreed as to which standard to apply, or, indeed, whether the two 
tests differ at all. Courts in some circuits found the two standards to 
be different and held that the change to heighten the nonstate actor 
test was arbitrary and capricious. Other courts held that the condone-
or-completely-helpless formulation was merely a permissible 
interpretation of the familiar unwilling-or-unable standard. 
In response, on January 14, 2021, the Acting AG issued 
Matter of A-B- II, redoubling the defense of the condone-or-complete-
helplessness articulation and evoking the agency’s Chevron and 
Brand X authority to combat decisions from the courts of appeals that 
had rejected Matter of A-B- I. The Acting AG claimed that the 
condone-or-complete-helplessness articulation was not a departure 
from the older unable-or-unwilling test, but he argued that even if it 
was a change in policy, it constituted a reasonable construction of the 
ambiguous statutory term “persecution.” In his elaboration of the 
condone-or-complete-helplessness standard, however, the Acting AG 
revealed that the new test is vastly more difficult to satisfy. He 
concluded that any state effort to protect victims—including even the 
most minimal effort—is sufficient to deny asylum protections. 
This Article provides the first systematic analysis of the 
impact of the heightened nonstate actor test in cases before both the 
Board of Immigration Appeals and federal courts. We argue that the 
two tests are, in fact, different by analyzing the plain language they 
employ as well as the divergent case outcomes they have produced. 
Then, rather than ground the nonstate actor standard in the term 
“persecution,” we anchor the standard in the statutory language 
defining refugees as those who are “unable or unwilling to avail 
[themselves] . . . of [state] protection,” a strangely ignored part of the 
U.S. asylum statute and international treaty. This novel theory has 
yet to be considered by the courts, but it demonstrates that the 
unwilling-or-unable test is the correct one. The heightened condone-
or-complete-helplessness standard, by contrast, is antithetical to the 
protections afforded by the statute and treaty and poses an 
insurmountable hurdle for many of the world’s most vulnerable 
refugees. 
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INTRODUCTION 
While asylum claims by individuals fleeing persecution by 
nonstate actors historically have been successful both in the United 
States 1  and beyond, 2  the Trump administration sought to 
significantly curb such claims. 3  As part of the administration’s 
reticulated assault on the U.S. asylum system,4 Attorneys General 
                                                            
1.  See infra Part II. 
2. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and 
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 65, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 
(1992 ed.), http://www.unhcr.org/4d93528a9.pdf [https://perma.cc/FT7L-ENUS] 
(clearly recognizing that harms inflicted by nonstate actors can constitute 
persecution “if the authorities refuse, or prove unable, to offer effective 
protection”). 
3.  See Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) [hereinafter Matter of 
A-B- I] (requiring applicants fleeing nonstate persecution to establish their 
government “condones” that persecution or is “completely helpless” to stop it, but 
providing no explanation for such an elevated standard); Matter of A-B-, 28 I&N 
Dec. 199 (A.G. 2021) [hereinafter Matter of A-B- II] (affirming Matter of A-B- I’s 
condone-or-complete-helplessness standard and adding a lengthy explanation 
aimed at justifying such a standard). 
4.  See, e.g., Eunice Lee, Regulating the Border, 79 MD. L. REV. 374, 375 
(2020) (“Since 2017 . . . the Trump Administration has issued a spate of policies 
targeting” asylum-seekers at the border as a “threat,” “invasion,” and 
“emergency.”); Fatma Marouf, Executive Overreaching in Immigration 
Adjudication, 93 TULANE L. REV. 707, 763–68 (2019) (discussing the Trump 
administration’s “policy” of turning away asylum-seekers at the southern border); 
see also Jennifer Lee Koh, Barricading the Immigration Courts, 69 DUKE L. REV. 
ONLINE, 48, 50 (Feb. 2020) (describing “[t]he Administration’s efforts to prevent 
adjudication in the immigration courts” as “a barricade: an improvised barrier”); 
E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 349 F. Supp. 3d 838, 844 (N.D. Cal. 2018), 
aff’d, 950 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding the Trump administration’s efforts to 
bar asylum to “immigrants who enter the country outside a port of entry” 
irreconcilably inconsistent with the expressed intent of Congress); O.A. v. Trump, 
404 F. Supp. 3d 109, 151 (D.D.C. 2019) (same); CAIR Coal. v. Trump, No. 19-cv-
2117 (TJK) (D.D.C. June 30, 2020) (finding the third country transit bar for 
asylum-seekers to be unlawful); Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of 
Removal, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,264 (proposed June 15, 2020) (proposing extensive 
changes that would virtually eliminate asylum protection in the United States); 
Order Suspending the Right to Introduce Certain Persons from Countries Where 
a Quarantinable Communicable Disease Exists, 85 Fed. Reg. 65,808 (Oct. 16, 
2020) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 265, 268) (indefinitely suspending entry to 
certain noncitizens—including asylum-seekers—traveling through Mexico); 
Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 1073, 1095 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, --- 
S. C.t. ---, 2020 WL 6121563 (2020) (No. 19-1212) (finding the Trump 
administration’s Migrant Protection Protocols (“MPP”)—more commonly known 
as the “Remain in Mexico” policy—to be unlawful); Delivered to Danger, HUM. 
RTS. WATCH, https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/campaign/remain-mexico 
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(“AG”) Jeff Sessions and William Barr, along with Acting AG Jeffrey 
Rosen, issued sweeping decisions with the apparent objective of 
dramatically reducing the probability of success for refugees fleeing 
nonstate persecutors. 5  The Trump administration framed its 
antipathy toward existing asylum structures as an effort to combat 
abuse in the system.6 However, the administration’s efforts to reduce 
access to protection for individuals fleeing nonstate persecution 
cannot be justified under the auspices of fraud prevention. Indeed, 
such nonstate actor claims have been long-recognized by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”)—the chief appellate body 
that issues administrative immigration decisions—and every federal 
court of appeals in the country. 7  Rather, the more probable 
motivation for targeting refugees fleeing nonstate persecutors 
stemmed from the administration’s policy decision to affect profound 
reductions in immigration in all areas.8 
                                                                                                                                     
[https://perma.cc/H7GH-RHB7] (noting the dangers faced by asylum-seekers 
turned away from the United States under MPP); Contrasting Experiences: MPP 
v. Non-MPP Court Cases, TRAC IMMIGR. (Dec. 19, 2019), https://trac.syr.edu/ 
immigration/reports/587/ [https://perma.cc/XYZ4-E29A] (examining the negative 
impact of MPP on immigration court outcomes); A Year of Horrors: The Trump 
Administration’s Illegal Returns of Asylum Seekers to Danger in Mexico, HUM. 
RTS. WATCH (Jan. 2020), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/ 
MPP-aYearofHorrors-UPDATED.pdf [https://perma.cc/YX2L-MGBE] (“Despite the 
overwhelming evidence that this illegal policy [MPP] is leading to kidnappings, 
torture, sexual assaults, legal representation barriers, and the denial and 
abandonment of genuine refugee protection requests, Trump 
Administration . . . officials continue to implement, expand, and tout this horrific 
policy as a ‘success.’”). 
5.  Among these decisions are Matter of A-B- I, 27 I&N at 227; Matter of A-
B- II, 28 I&N Dec. at 199; Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 581, 581 (A.G. 2019); and 
Matter of E-R-A-L-, 27 I&N Dec. 767, 767 (B.I.A. 2020); see also Matter of A-C-A-
A-, 28 I&N Dec. 84, 85 (A.G. 2020) (“In recent decisions, former Attorney General 
Sessions and I . . . have explained that victims of private violence . . . will not 
usually satisfy the requirements for asylum . . . .”). 
6.  President Donald J. Trump Is Working to Stop the Abuse of Our Asylum 




7.  See infra Sections II.A–C. 
8.  See Michael Shear & Maggie Haberman, Trump’s Temporary Halt to 
Immigration Is Part of Broader Plan, Stephen Miller Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/24/us/politics/coronavirus-trump-
immigration-stephen-miller.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law 
Review). Indeed, White House Senior Policy Adviser Stephen Miller has said that 
stopping asylum seekers is “all [he] care[s] about” and that he would be “happy if 
not a single refugee” came to the United States. Molly Olmstead, Stephen Miller: 
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Traditionally, nonstate actor persecutor claims have turned 
upon determinations related to whether a putative refugee’s country 
of nationality is insufficiently able and willing to afford protection, 
such that the refugee9 is justified in seeking surrogate protection in 
another country.10 Long before the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, 
which incorporated international refugee law principles into domestic 
law, U.S. adjudicators recognized that a refugee can be one fleeing 
state-perpetrated persecution or nonstate persecution from which the 
state is either “unable or unwilling” to provide effective protection.11 
The unable-or-unwilling standard, interpreted and applied according 
to the ordinary meaning of those words, is consonant with both 
international legal interpretations as well as the constructions 
                                                                                                                                     
Stopping Asylum Seekers Is “All I Care About,” SLATE (Feb. 21, 2020), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/02/stephen-miller-immigration-this-is-
my-life.html [https://perma.cc/QY2J-M8Y8]; Ellen Cranley, Stephen Miller Said 
He “Would Be Happy If Not a Single Refugee” Came to the U.S., BUS. INSIDER 
(Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/stephen-miller-said-he-would-
be-happy-if-not-a-single-refugee-came-to-us-2019-1 [https://perma.cc/6YE2-H3X3]. 
9.  The burden of proving that an applicant is a “refugee” pursuant to the 
Immigration and Nationality Act rests on the applicant. 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). To qualify for asylum, an individual must show that they 
suffered past persecution or have a well-founded fear of future persecution on 
account of a protected ground. Id. Although courts have interpreted the term 
“persecution” to require a showing of something more than mere discrimination or 
harassment, it is not clearly defined in the Act or its implementing regulations. 
See Stanojkova v. Holder, 645 F.3d 943, 947–48 (7th Cir. 2011); Borca v. INS, 77 
F.3d 210, 214 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The Immigration Act does not, however, provide a 
statutory definition for the term ‘persecution.’”). The applicant must also show 
that they have a status that is protected by the Act, and they must show that the 
persecution occurred or will occur “on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1101(a)(42)(B). If an applicant demonstrates past persecution, they are entitled 
to a presumption that they have a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 
C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2014). An asylum applicant can also establish asylum 
eligibility based upon an independent showing of a well-founded fear of future 
persecution. See Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439, 446 (B.I.A. 1987). 
Withholding of removal is similar to asylum in that an applicant must also show 
that they meet the definition of a refugee, but a successful applicant must instead 
show that they face a clear probability of harm, rather than merely a well-founded 
fear of future persecution, to be granted protection. See infra notes 67, 74. 
10.  DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES § 4:8 (2019 
ed.). 
11.  Rosa v. INS, 440 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1971); Matter of Tan, 12 I&N 
Dec. 564, 568 (B.I.A. 1967); Matter of Pierre, 15 I&N Dec. 461, 462 (B.I.A. 1975). 
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adopted by other signatories to the multilateral 1951 Refugee 
Convention.12 
However, the Trump administration heightened the nonstate 
actor standard to an extent that, if unchecked, it essentially 
eliminates nonstate actor asylum claims. AG Sessions wrote in 
Matter of A-B- I that to satisfy the nonstate actor requirement, an 
applicant must show that their government has “more than difficulty 
controlling private behavior;” rather, they must demonstrate that 
their government either “condones” the persecution or is “completely 
helpless” to protect them from such persecution.13  More than two 
years later, in elaborating on this condone-or-completely-helpless 
standard, Acting AG Rosen explained in Matter of A-B- II that it is 
meant to delimit “when persecution committed by non-governmental 
actors may be attributed to the government.” 14  He stated that a 
government is not “completely helpless” simply for “failing to provide 
a particular standard of protection, or for lapses in protection.”15 
Rather, he provided that the “level of inaction or ineffectiveness 
required” is quite high,16 as the words completely helpless indicate. 
Such an articulation provides a virtually insuperable requirement for 
legitimate refugees fleeing nonstate-perpetrated violence. Based upon 
the plain language alone, failing to demonstrate utter powerlessness 
on the part of the state to provide protection—rather than a mere 
inability or unwillingness to do so—will prove fatal in essentially all 
nonstate actor claims subjected to this heightened nonstate actor 
test.17 
Only failed states can be fairly characterized as “completely 
helpless” to provide protection,18 and claims involving failed states 
comprise an exceptionally small number of all asylum claims.19 AG 
                                                            
12.  See ANKER, supra note 10, § 4:8 (“A state fails in its duty to protect if it 
is unwilling or unable to . . . reduce the risk of serious harm to ‘the point where 
the fear of persecution could be said to be no longer well-founded.’”); Ward v. Att’y 
Gen. of Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R 689, 724; Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99 [2000] 
NZAR 545 at para. 64 (noting that “it would seem to defeat the purpose of 
international protection if a claimant would be required to risk his or her life 
seeking ineffective protection of a state, merely to demonstrate that 
ineffectiveness”). 
13.  Matter of A-B- I, 27 I&N Dec. 227, 227 (A.G. 2018). 
14.  Matter of A-B- II, 28 I&N Dec. 199, 200 (A.G. 2021). 
15.  Id. at 202. 
16.  Id. at 204. 
17.  See infra Section V.A. 
18.  See infra Section V.A. 
19.  See Sarah Bressan, What’s Left of the Failed States Debate?, GLOB. PUB. 
POL’Y INST. (May 13, 2020), https://www.gppi.net/2020/05/13/whats-left-of-the-
2021] Unwilling or Unable? 449 
Sessions clearly recognized the dramatic winnowing effect that his 
vision of this test would entail, writing that “[g]enerally,” claims 
based upon harms “perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not 
qualify for asylum.” 20  He reasoned, “[w]hile I do not decide that 
violence inflicted by non-governmental actors may never serve as the 
basis for . . . asylum . . . , in practice such claims are unlikely to 
satisfy the statutory grounds for proving group persecution that the 
government is unable or unwilling to address.” 21  Although AG 
Sessions continued to use the “unable or unwilling” language 
throughout the decision, it is clear that he did not intend for that 
language to function as it has historically. 22  Betraying his true 
intentions, he wrote that where the persecutor is not a government 
actor, the adjudicator 23  must consider “the government’s role in 
sponsoring or enabling such actions.”24 Doubling down on this claim, 
Acting AG Rosen added that only where government efforts “have 
fallen so far short of adequate protection” as to demonstrate the 
government played “some role in or responsibility for the persecution” 
is the standard satisfied. 25  Rather than adhere to the traditional 
“unable or unwilling” requirement, Matter of A-B- I and II suggest 
that an applicant must now demonstrate state sponsorship or 
empowerment of persecution. Such a requirement constitutes a 
radical departure from the traditional standard, tantamount to the 
                                                                                                                                     
failed-states-debate [https://perma.cc/FM6J-RRZR] (“Very few states have 
completely failed.”). 
20.  Matter of A-B- I, 27 I&N Dec. at 320 (emphasis added). 
21.  Id. (emphasis added). 
22.  Id.; see also Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 898–99 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“[A]s 
a matter of plain language, the two formulations are hardly interchangeable. A 
government that ‘condones’ or is ‘completely helpless’ in the face of persecution is 
obviously more culpable, or more incompetent, than one that is simply ‘unwilling 
or unable’ to protect its citizens.”). 
23.  We use the term “adjudicator” because asylum decisions are issued by 
the federal courts of appeals, the BIA, immigration judges, and asylum officers. 
Asylum cases are adjudicated by both the Asylum Office, part of the Department 
of Homeland Security, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), 
part of the Department of Justice. EOIR is composed of immigration judges and 
the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 208.2 (2014); Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., About the Office, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST. (Feb. 2014), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/orginfo.htm 
[https://perma.cc/T4SY-ZWK8]. Because only EOIR typically issues published 
decisions, all references to the “agency” are to EOIR. 
24.  Matter of A-B- I, 27 I&N Dec. at 318. 
25. Matter of A-B- II, 28 I&N Dec. at 204–05. 
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heightened state acquiescence standard found in claims for protection 
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).26 
While only a few courts of appeals have reacted to the 
heightened nonstate actor requirement of Matter of A-B- I, those that 
have weighed in have deeply disagreed on how to address the test—a 
result that will continue to sow confusion for vulnerable asylum 
seekers.27  Additionally, courts that have employed the heightened 
test demonstrate just how devastating it can be. A close analysis of 
case law from the Eighth Circuit, which has used and applied the 
condone-or-complete-helplessness standard in more cases than any 
other circuit, proves how exceedingly difficult it is to surpass that 
threshold.28 
In the course of considering Matter of A-B- I’s construction of 
the nonstate actor requirement, the litigation positions of the 
government (in defending the condone-or-completely-helpless 
standard) and some advocates (in resisting Matter of A-B- I’s 
standard) have overlapped in surprising ways. Some refugee 
advocates have argued that while the AG might have intended to 
heighten the nonstate actor standard, he did not clearly accomplish 
that.29 This strategy emanates both from the need to litigate these 
                                                            
26.  Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1) (requiring that an applicant for CAT 
relief show that the torture would be “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with 
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity”). 
27.  Juan Antonio v. Barr, No. 18-3500, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 15984, at *9 
(6th Cir. May 19, 2020) (finding domestic violence victim was eligible for asylum 
under unwilling or unable standard); Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 331, 333 (2d 
Cir. 2020) (interpreting unwilling or unable standard as, “(1) condoned the private 
actions, or (2) at least demonstrated a "complete helplessness to protect the 
victims”); Grace, 965 F.3d at 898–99 (holding the two standards are different, “A 
government that ‘condones’ or is “completely helpless” in the face of persecution is 
obviously more culpable, or more incompetent, than one that  is simply ‘unwilling 
or unable’ to protect its citizens.”); Jimenez Galloso v. Barr, 954 F.3d 1189, 1192 
(8th Cir. 2020), as amended (Apr. 15, 2020) (“To the extent that the condone-or-
completely-helpless standard conflicts with the unable-or-unwilling standard, the 
latter standard controls.”); Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 233 (5th Cir. 
2019) (holding that the AG, “did not raise the standard for the government's 
unwillingness or inability to protect to the ‘complete helplessness’ standard.”).  
28.  See infra Part II. 
29.  See, e.g., Gonzales-Veliz, 938 F.3d at 233 (“As Gonzales-Veliz 
acknowledges, in this circuit as well as others, the ‘inability or unwillingness’ 
standard is interchangeable with the ‘complete helplessness’ standard.” (emphasis 
added)); see also Kaci Bishop, Unconventional Actors, 44 N.C. J. INT’L L. 519, 529 
(2019) (“[D]espite including rhetoric suggesting a heightened standard, Matter of 
A-B- actually only applied the ‘unable or unwilling’ to control standard.”). 
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cases before Asylum Officers (“AOs”) and Immigration Judges 
(“IJs”)—who are bound by Matter of A-B- I30—and a desire to defuse 
the government’s call for Chevron deference.31 In an odd parallel, the 
government’s primary defense of Matter of A-B- I is that, because the 
condone-or-completely-helpless standard did not meaningfully alter 
the unable-or-unwilling standard, it is simply an acceptable gloss on 
the traditional rule.32 If the standard is unchanged, the government 
argues, it cannot possibly be causing harm or altering outcomes.33 
Efforts before the courts of appeals to argue that the standard 
is unchanged have been mixed.34 The risk in arguing that Matter of  
A-B- I and II did not elevate the standard is that asylum seekers will 
be stuck with all of the negative consequences attendant to the 
condone-or-completely-helpless standard (i.e., that the plain language 
of this standard is objectively more difficult to satisfy) without any 
ability to argue that the heightened standard is an erroneous and 
unreasoned departure from the existing standard.35 In this Article, we 
contend that Matter of A-B- I and II did intend to heighten the 
standard and that there is a danger in not clearly calling out and 
challenging the condone-or-completely-helpless language as a more 
onerous test. While we understand the impulse to take the position 
                                                            
30.  8 C.F.R. §§ 103.10(b), 1003.1(g) (2020). 
31.  See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 
(2016) (describing the case law surrounding Chevron deference and the procedural 
requirements for agency decision-making). 
32.   Grace, 965 F.3d at 898 (“The government insists that no change 
occurred, that is, that the two standards are identical.”) 
33.  Id. 
34.  Compare Gonzales-Veliz, 938 F.3d at 233 (rejecting the appellant’s 
argument that the BIA misinterpreted A-B- I as heightening the standard for the 
government’s showing because the “complete helplessness” standard is 
interchangeable with the “inability or unwillingness standard”) and Scarlett v. 
Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 333 (2d Cir. 2020) (stating that the “complete helplessness to 
protect” standard is not a novel formulation of the “unwilling or unable” standard, 
but instead one well-grounded in circuit precedent which does not “impermissibly 
heighten an applicant’s burden”) with Grace, 965 F.3d at 898–99 (“[T]he two 
formulations are hardly interchangeable. A government that ‘condones’ or is 
‘completely helpless’ in the face of persecution is obviously more culpable, or more 
incompetent, than one that is simply ‘unwilling or unable’ to protect its citizens.”); 
see also Ellison & Gupta, Un(avail)able Protection: The Shifting Legal Landscape 
in the Eighth Circuit and Beyond for Asylum-Seekers Fleeing Nonstate 
Persecution, 25 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1061, 1070–72 (2020) (comparing 
decisions that have found the unable-or-unwilling articulation to be synonymous 
with the condone-or-completely-helpless articulation with decisions that have 
found the two standards to be different). 
35.   Cf. Grace, 965 F.3d at 898–99 (noting that “as a matter of plain 
language, the two formulations are hardly interchangeable”). 
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that Matter of A-B- I and II did not actually heighten the standard 
when litigating before IJs and the BIA, advocates must be careful to 
preserve arguments that the agency did in fact alter and elevate the 
nonstate actor standard in a way that is contrary to the statute and 
congressional intent.36 
Until now, there has been no comprehensive study of nonstate 
actor claims that juxtaposes pre-A-B- I cases with post-A-B- I cases. 
While there has been some scholarship related to Matter of A-B- I and 
its use of the condone-or-completely-helpless standard,37 more work is 
needed to show the effects of this articulation of the nonstate actor 
persecutor requirement. It is particularly important to address this 
void given Matter of A-B- II’s claim that the condone-or-completely-
helpless standard is not discernably different from the traditional 
unable-or-unwilling standard.38 Not only does such a position require 
adjudicators to ignore the differences in the plain language of the two 
standards, it also ignores the strong correlation between nearly all 
cases citing the heightened standard and the outcome of those cases: 
denial of asylum.39 
In addition to showing the negative effects of the condone-or-
completely-helpless standard, there is a need to rethink the best legal 
strategy to combat that heightened standard. While much attention 
has been given to grounding the traditional unable-or-unwilling 
standard in the term “persecution,” 40  advocates should begin to 
advance arguments that situate the unable-or-unwilling standard in 
the terms of the Refugee Act41 and Refugee Convention42 that speak of 
                                                            
36.  See, e.g., Kanagu v. Holder, 781 F.3d 912, 917 (8th Cir. 2015) (noting 
that circuit courts “lack jurisdiction to consider arguments not clearly made before 
the agency”). 
37.   See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 29, at 531–40 (arguing that a state 
condones or is helpless to prevent harms when it has been usurped by a 
nongovernmental actor or has delegated its authority to a nongovernmental 
actor); Theresa A. Vogel, Critiquing Matter of A-B-: An Uncertain Future in 
Asylum Proceedings for Women Fleeing Intimate Partner Violence, 52 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 343, 398 (2019) (arguing that the condoned-or-completely-helpless 
standard in Matter of A-B- I is inconsistent with Matter of Acosta, Matter of M-E-
V-G-, and Matter of W-G-R-); Mikhail Izrailev, A New Normative Approach for the 
Grant of Asylum in Cases of Non-State Actor Persecution, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 171, 177–79 (2011) (summarizing the nonstate actor requirement prior 
to Matter of A-B- I). 
38.  See Matter of A-B- II, 28 I&N Dec. at 200-02. 
39.  See infra Part II. 
40.  See infra Part II. 
41.  1980 Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. 
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refugees as those who are “unable or unwilling to avail [themselves] 
of protection” of the state “because of . . . a well-founded fear of 
persecution.” Despite the obvious linguistic analogue between “unable 
or unwilling to avail . . . of protection” and “unable or unwilling to 
protect,” courts have ignored this statutory basis for the nonstate 
actor requirement, preferring instead to root the test in the term 
“persecution.” 43  However, efforts to push back on the agency’s 
heightened test that couple the traditional standard with the 
statutory term “persecution”—which many courts have found to be 
ambiguous44—are less likely to be successful given the deference that 
is accorded to the BIA under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. (“Chevron”) and National Cable & 
Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services (“Brand 
X”).45 
                                                                                                                                     
42.  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, July 28, 1951, 19 
U.S.T. 6259 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. 
43.  Miranda v. INS, 139 F.3d 624, 626–27 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that the 
Board in Acosta “adopt[ed] the pre-1980 definition of ‘persecution’ for purposes of 
interpreting . . . § 1101(a)(42)(A),” one “required component[] of” which is “the 
harm or suffering . . . be inflicted either by the government of a country or by 
[those] . . . the government [is] unable or unwilling to control”); see also Matter of 
McMullen, 17 I&N Dec. 542, 545 (B.I.A. 1980) (“We will therefore require under 
the new Act, as we did under the old law, that an alien must show . . . persecution 
at the hands of an organization or person from which the government cannot or 
will not protect the alien.”); Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 222–23 (B.I.A. 
1985) (concluding that because the “unable or unwilling” standard was a 
“significant aspect[] of . . . [the] accepted construction of the term ‘persecution’” 
prior to the passage of the Refugee Act, it thus “should be applied to the term as it 
appears in [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)]”). 
44.  See, e.g., Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 333 (2d Cir. 2020) (finding the 
term “persecution” to be ambiguous); Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 897 (D.C. Cir. 
2020) (“The INA nowhere defines the term ‘persecution.’”). 
45.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
43 (1984). Chevron deference is frequently analyzed as part of a two-step process. 
At Step One, if “a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, 
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that 
intention is the law and must be given effect.” Id. at 843. However, if the statute 
is ambiguous, then a court must proceed to Step Two, where it is required to defer 
to a reasonable or permissible agency interpretation provided the agency is 
authorized to interpret the statute and has spoken “with [the] force of law.” 
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237 (2001). When an agency provides 
such a reasonable construction of an ambiguous statutory term, that 
interpretation takes precedence even over a contrary construction by a court. See 
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 984 
(2005). While we do not concede that the condone-or-completely-helpless 
formulation is a reasonable interpretation of the statutory provision at issue, we 
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Moreover, given the recent issuance of Matter of A-B- II, 
which explicitly appeals to the agency’s authority under Chevron and 
Brand X, 46  it is more important than ever to advance statutory 
arguments that firmly ground the unable-or-unwilling test in the 
unambiguous language of the text. Indeed, even if the incoming Biden 
administration were to withdraw Matter of A-B- I and II, the need to 
properly construe the nonstate actor element of the refugee definition 
would persist because the traditional justification for the nonstate 
actor element that roots the test in the term “persecution” leaves the 
nonstate actor element vulnerable to harmful modifications by future 
administrations. 47  As such, the framework for which we advocate 
here—one that durably anchors the nonstate actor element in the 
plain text of the statute relating to state protection—is of vital 
importance even in a post-Matter of A-B- world.48  
This Article will first focus on the origin and earliest 
understanding of the state protection analysis in international law. 
Part I will delve into the historical development of state protection 
considerations, beginning with the formation of international 
documents leading up to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 
Protocol. It will trace the evolution of these concepts as they are 
incorporated into U.S. law, first through the passage of the 
withholding statute and then later through the passage of the 1980 
Refugee Act. Given clear congressional intent to bring U.S. law into 
conformity with international standards, Part I aims to frame up how 
these interpretive developments should shape our understanding of 
nonstate actor claims. Part II will then survey how these concepts 
                                                                                                                                     
acknowledge, as we must, that most Chevron Step Two/Brand X challenges fail. 
See Lee, supra note 4, at 378–83. 
46.  Matter of A-B- II, 28 I&N Dec. at 213. 
47.  See infra Section V.B. 
48.  Additionally, there are at least two other reasons why a simple reversal 
of Matter of A-B- I and II is not a panacea. First, several circuit courts have 
already adopted Matter of A-B- I’s test and thus withdrawal of Matter of A-B- I 
and II would not automatically undo all of the damage the agency has wrought. 
Instead, further litigation on this issue will be required, at a minimum, in the 
Second and Fifth Circuits. See Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 233 (5th Cir. 
2019); Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 333 (2d Cir. 2020). Second, two other 
circuits had used the heightened language even before Matter of A-B- I sought to 
adopt it nationwide. Thus, even if Matter of A-B- I and II both disappear, a risk 
will remain that courts of appeals could advance narrow constructions of the 
standard independent of the agency. For examples of narrow constructions, see 
Hor v. Gonzalez, 421 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 2005); Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 
918, 921 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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have percolated within U.S. refugee jurisprudence (in the agency, the 
federal courts of appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court) prior to the 
AG’s decision in Matter of A-B- I. This survey serves as a baseline for 
comparing how decisions have been resolved since Matter of A-B- I. 
Part III will then address the fundamentally flawed approach 
adopted by the AG in Matter of A-B- I by applying the analysis begun 
in Parts I and II. Part IV looks at the challenges that have been 
brought against Matter of A-B- I with a focus on where challenges 
have succeeded and where others have come up short. Part IV also 
highlights the disagreement among the courts as to the proper 
standard for nonstate actor claims that has resulted from Matter of  
A-B- I. Finally, Part V will cast a vision for an alternative framework 
for understanding the unable-or-unwilling nonstate actor analysis 
that is grounded in the related statutory terms “avail 
of . . . protection” and “well-founded fear.” There, we argue that the 
condone-or-completely-helpless standard is fundamentally 
irreconcilable with the clearly expressed congressional intent 
demonstrated by the terms of the statute, binding case law, and 
international law. Specifically, we argue that the statutory terms 
“avail of . . . [state] protection” and “well-founded fear” require a 
probability of harm analysis to serve as a lodestar for any proper 
understanding of the nonstate actor persecution analysis. 
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE PROTECTION ANALYSIS 
This Part begins by discussing the relevant international 
refugee law foundations and traces how those concepts were 
translated into U.S. asylum law, with particular focus on the state 
protection component of the refugee framework and its tight link to 
the well-founded fear analysis. It also describes the interaction 
between international legal developments of the nonstate actor 
requirement and U.S. asylum law to set the stage for our discussion 
of Matter of A-B- I and II and their radical departure from the 
longstanding nonstate actor analysis. 
A. Core International Law Instrument: The 1951 Refugee 
Convention 
Born from the ashes of World War II, the U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees serves as the historical foundation 
of the contemporary refugee framework.49 The Refugee Convention 
                                                            
49.  ANKER, supra note 10, § 4:8. 
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defines a refugee, in relevant part, as one who “owing to [a] well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country.”50 Guy Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam note that the 
foregoing definition gives primacy to “a well-founded fear of 
persecution,” and references only secondarily the state of being 
“unable or unwilling, by reason of such fear, to use of take advantage 
of the protection of their government.”51 
This conclusion is supported both by the text of the Refugee 
Convention and its precursor documents. Prior to the creation of the 
Refugee Convention, a number of international legal instruments 
went so far as to provide categorical relief to those without state 
protection, irrespective of nexus to a protected characteristic.52 And 
even after the nexus requirement was added, the primacy of 
protection was still evident. For example, the Constitution of the 
International Refugee Organization (“IRO”) 53  provided a 
multipronged protection analysis for “displaced persons” who were 
“expelled from their own countries” for reasons of “race, religion, 
nationality, or political opinion,” as well as “those unable or unwilling 
to avail themselves of the protection of the government of their 
country.” 54  In other words, in addition to harm on account of a 
protected characteristic, lack of state protection provided an 
alternative basis upon which to qualify for relief. The IRO regime 
“expressly recognized that individuals might have ‘valid objections’ to 
returning to their country of origin, including ‘persecution or fear 
based on reasonable grounds of persecution because of race, religion, 
nationality or political opinion.’”55 Likewise, the UNHCR’s Statute 
contained similar language, applying to any person who “is unable or, 
                                                            
50.  Refugee Convention, supra note 42, art. 1 (emphasis added). 
51.   GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd ed. 2007) (1983). 
52.  Id. at 16 (noting that being (a) outside one’s country of origin and (b) 
without protection of the government of that state were sufficient and necessary 
conditions to qualify as a refugee under a 1926 agreement). A similar standard 
was used to grant relief to persons fleeing Nazi Germany. Id. at 17 (noting that 
refugee arrangements covered those “possessing . . . German nationality . . . who 
are provided not to enjoy, in law or fact the protection of the German 
Government”). 
53.   The IRO was the precursor office to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
54.  GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 51, at 19 (emphasis added). 
55.  Id. 
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because of such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
the government of the country of his nationality.”56 
An influential 1949 U.N. report gives meaning to the types of 
state protection contemplated in the foregoing international 
documents. The report describes refugees as “persons who, having left 
the country of which they were nationals, no longer enjoy the 
protection and assistance of their national authorities, either because 
these authorities refuse to grant them assistance and protection, or 
because they themselves renounce the assistance and protection of 
the countries of which they are nationals.”57 It further explains that 
such protection includes “efforts to improve the status of citizens 
abroad,” “oversight of . . . conventions and actions to ensure the rights 
granted to citizens are actually respected,” “consular services,” “the 
provision of passports,” and similar services.58  Yet, the protection 
contemplated clearly went further than the mere “external” state 
protection just described. The report also noted that “[i]n attempt[ing] 
to make good the deficiency of national protection, the international 
protection agency should therefore aim to protect the refugee’s basic 
human rights, including the right to life, liberty, and security of the 
person.”59 Taken together, the foregoing elaboration of the term “state 
protection” shows a more expansive understanding of states’ 
obligations vis-a-vis their citizens than is often evident in 
contemporary analyses.60 
Professor Goodwin-Gill writes that state protection is “an 
integral part of the . . . determination that a well-founded fear of 
persecution exists,” but it should not be elevated above, or to the 
exclusion of, the probability of harm analysis.61 As one scholar has 
explained, “[t]he whole ethos of humanitarian protection” supports 
                                                            
56.  Id. at 21. Goodwin-Gill and McAdam point out that whether under the 
statute one “must also prove a lack of protection is debatable.” Id. (emphasis in 
original). 
57. Id. at 21 (emphasis added) (citing U.N. Secretary-General, A Study of 
Statelessness, U.N. Doc. E/1112;E/1112/Add.1 (Aug. 1949)). 
58.  Id. at 22; see also Antonio Fortin, The Meaning of ‘Protection’ in the 
Refugee Definition, 12 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 548, 551–58 (2001) (arguing that the 
meaning of protection in international refugee law refers to a “diplomatic 
protection”). 
59.  GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 51, at 23. 
60.    Contemporary understandings of the term “state protection” have 
tended to focus on the “internal protection” a state offers almost to the exclusion 
of those historical “external protections” contemplated early on. Id. at 22 n.30 
(citing Januzi v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 5, 
[2006] 2 AC (HL) 426 (appeal taken from Eng.)). 
61.  Id. 
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the assertion that the “only criterion under human rights treaty law 
is whether the person will be subject to substantial risk of harm from 
the non-state actor. If there is such a risk, the human rights treaty 
obligation . . . should prevent . . . a state from sending individuals 
into harm’s way.”62 Thus, employing the semi-effectiveness of a state’s 
protection apparatus as a means of denying refugee status to one who 
otherwise has a well-founded fear of persecution is simply 
antithetical to the intent of the Refugee Convention.63 
B. Incorporating the International Refugee Definition into U.S. 
Law Through the 1980 Refugee Act 
While U.S. law “did not utilize the Refugee Convention’s exact 
language” in describing the state protection element, “the U.S. 
Supreme Court has long recognized congressional intent to construe 
the asylum and refugee provisions consistently with the 
Convention.”64 The Refugee Act of 198065 adopts a definition of the 
                                                            
62.   ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE 
ACTORS 335–41 (Grainne de Burca et al. eds 2006); see also ANKER, supra note 10, 
§ 4.8 (“A state often cannot completely eliminate the risk of actions by private 
parties, but . . . is expected to take effective actions toward protecting persons who 
are being harmed by private actors, reducing the level of risk to below that of a 
well-founded fear.”); Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 128 (4th Cir. 
2011) (noting that even if the Salvadoran government had “focused law 
enforcement efforts on suppressing gang violence,” a factual inquiry into the 
specific record of the case was necessary to determine if the government was able 
to prevent the persecution); Malu v. U.S. Att’y. Gen., 764 F.3d 1282, 1292 (11th 
Cir. 2014) (highlighting the actions taken by authorities to prevent a mob 
lynching of a lesbian woman while pointing out that the IJ did not consider this 
incident in isolation but looked at the state’s overall record, which “shows the 
government . . . is not, in fact, unable or unwilling to control private actors”). 
63.  See GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 51, at 12. The preamble to 
the 1951 Refugee Convention states that its object and purpose is to assure to 
“‘refugees the widest possible exercise of . . . fundamental rights and freedoms.’” 
Id. at 7–8. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties “confirms that a treaty 
‘shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.’” Id. (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for 
signature May 23, 1969, art. 1, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31(1) (entered into force 
Jan. 27, 1980)). 
64.   Charles Shane Ellison, Defending Refugees: A Case for Protective 
Procedural Safeguards in the Persecutor Bar Analysis, 33 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 213, 
221 (2019) (pointing out that in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 437 (1987), 
the Court, in noting the link between INA §208(a) and Article 34 of the Refugee 
Convention, observed that there were “many statements indicating Congress’ 
intent that the new statutory definition of ‘refugee’ be interpreted in conformance 
with the Protocol’s definition”); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 421, 427 (1999) 
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term “refugee” that is clearly anchored in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention 66  and 1967 Protocol. 67  Under U.S. law, a refugee is 
defined in relevant part as: 
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such 
person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having 
no nationality, is outside any country in which such 
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or 
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to 
avail himself or herself of the protection of, that 
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear 
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.”68 
With respect to the state protection element, the parallels 
between U.S. and international law are clear: where U.S law speaks 
of refugees as those who are “unable or unwilling to return to, and [] 
unable or unwilling to avail [themselves] . . . of [state] 
protection . . . because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution,” the Refugee Convention states that refugees are those 
who “owing to [a] well-founded fear of being persecuted [are] outside 
the country of [their] nationality and [are] unable or, owing to such 
fear, [are] unwilling to avail [themselves]. . . of [their country’s] 
protection.” 69  Both provisions conspicuously use the “unable or 
unwilling to avail of . . . [state] protection” framing. Additionally, both 
provisions overtly link the reason for why a refugee would be “unable 
or unwilling” to seek state protection to a well-founded fear of 
persecution. 
                                                                                                                                     
(recognizing that the “withholding provision . . . parallels [the Refugee 
Convention’s] Article 33”)). 
65.  Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). 
66.  Refugee Convention, supra note 42. 
67.  Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 
31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6224, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol]. The United 
States acceded to Articles 2 through 34 of the Refugee Convention when it signed 
on to the Protocol in 1968. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 416 (1984); INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 429 (1987). The withholding of removal provision 
of INA §241(b)(3) (formerly INA section 243(h)), which prohibits the removal of a 
noncitizen to a country where their “life or freedom would be threatened” because 
of a protected ground, also corresponds to the Refugee Convention. See Refugee 
Convention, supra note 42, art. 33(1) (discussing the signatory-states’ obligation 
to not expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee where their life or freedom would be 
threatened). 
68.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (emphasis added). 
69.  Refugee Convention, supra note 42, art. 1 (emphasis added). 
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Given the well-established interpretive rule of understanding 
the meaning of terms used in the U.S. refugee definition by looking to 
the Refugee Convention,70 one would expect U.S. asylum adjudicators 
to have grounded their understanding of the nonstate actor doctrine 
in the “unable or unwilling to avail of state protection” language, 
informed by the meaning of the term “well-founded fear.” However, 
they have uniformly failed to do so. Rather, as discussed in the next 
Section, U.S. adjudicators have rooted the nonstate actor doctrine in 
the statutory term “persecution” and have analyzed it in an insular 
fashion, untethered to determinations of whether fears of such 
persecution are well-founded. 
C. Earliest U.S. Case Law Grounds the Nonstate Actor Doctrine in 
the Term “Persecution” 
Early on, the BIA and federal courts of appeals began to 
explain that the term “persecution” in the Refugee Act meant harm 
perpetrated by the applicant’s home government or a nonstate actor 
that the government is unable or unwilling to control.71 The Board, in 
a seminal decision, Matter of Acosta, noted that the “unable or 
unwilling” standard was a “significant aspect[] of . . . [the] accepted 
construction of the term ‘persecution,’” long before the passage of the 
Refugee Act. 72  The precursor statute 73  to the contemporary 
withholding of removal provision—intended to implement the United 
States’ nonrefoulment obligations under Article 33 of the Refugee 
Convention74—required the Board and the courts to engage in a very 
                                                            
70.  Matter of Negusie, 27 I&N Dec. 347, 353–60 (B.I.A. 2018). Here, the 
Board explained that “[i]t is well established that Congress enacted the Refugee 
Act to bring the U.S. law into conformity with the Convention and Protocol.” Id. at 
353. 
71.  Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985) (emphasis added) 
(describing the term “persecution” as encompassing both harms inflicted “by the 
government of a country” as well as those “by persons . . . that the government was 
unable or unwilling to control” (emphasis added)). 
72.  Id. at 222–23 (emphasis added) (citing McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 
1315 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981)). In McMullen, the Court noted the government’s 
concession that “persecution within the meaning of [former] § 243(h) [the prior 
withholding statute] includes [harms] by non-governmental groups . . . where it is 
shown that the government . . . is unwilling or unable to control that group.” 658 
F.2d at 1315 n.2 (emphasis added). 
73.   Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, H.R. 5678, 82nd Cong.  
§ 243(h) (1952) [hereinafter Former INA § 243(h)]. 
74.  INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 429 (1987). In Cardoza-Fonesca, 
the Supreme Court explained: 
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similar analysis as that called for in the Refugee Convention. 75 
During the course of the case law’s development regarding that 
provision’s definition of persecutory harm, adjudicators had reached 
the consensus that such harm could be inflicted either by a 
government or a nongovernmental actor that the government was 
unable or unwilling to control.76 As far back as at least 1967, the 
Board had recognized that relief could be available even as it relates 
to a fear of harm inflicted by a nonstate actor.77 And by 1975, the 
Board had worked out a fully-fledged articulation that “even though 
the persecution was . . . not connected with any government,” where 
“the government concerned was either unwilling or unable to control 
the persecuting individual or group,” protection could be granted.78 
Thus, when the question arose as to the meaning of the term 
“persecution” as used in the Refugee Act, the Board in Acosta 
concluded that the established nonstate actor doctrine “should be 
applied to the term [persecution] as it appears in [the Refugee Act]” to 
the same extent as it had been applied in cases dealing with 
                                                                                                                                     
In 1968 . . . the United States agreed to comply with the 
substantive provisions of Articles 2 through 34 of the 1951 
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
Article 33.1 of the Convention . . . which is the counterpart of  
§ 243(h) . . . imposed a mandatory duty on contracting States 
not to return [noncitizens] to a country where his “life or 
freedom would be threatened.” 
Id. (citing 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6259–6276, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (1968); INS v. Stevic, 467 
U.S. 407, 416–17 (1984)). 
75.  Stevic, 467 U.S. at 423 (“Section 243(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h), 
requires the Attorney General to withhold deportation of an alien who 
demonstrates that his ‘life or freedom would be threatened’ on account of one of 
the listed factors if he is deported.”). In Stevic, the Supreme Court held that to 
qualify for withholding of removal, one must demonstrate that “it is more likely 
than not that the alien would be subject to persecution” in the country to which he 
would be returned. Id. at 429–30 (emphasis added). As compared to asylum, 
withholding covers “a narrower class of [noncitizens] who are given a statutory 
right not to be deported to the country where they are in danger.” Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 424. 
76.  Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 222–23. 
77.   Matter of Tan, 12 I&N Dec. 564, 568 (B.I.A. 1967) (recognizing the 
availability of relief where “a government cannot control” nonstate actor 
persecution); Rosa v. INS, 440 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1971) (noting that while the 
legislative history is silent on nonstate actor harm, the Board “took a clear 
position on the issue in [Matter of] Tan . . . ‘that the [withholding] statute does not 
require proof of persecution by an organized government” (citing Matter of Tan, 12 
I&N Dec. at 568)). 
78.  Matter of Pierre, 15 I&N Dec. 461, 462 (B.I.A. 1975) (emphasis added). 
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withholding of removal. 79  To reach this conclusion, the Board 
employed the basic rules of statutory construction and relied on the 
well-established maxim that “words used in an original act . . . , that 
are repeated in subsequent legislation with a similar purpose, are 
presumed to be used in the same sense.”80 Accordingly, the Board had 
no trouble concluding that Congress intended for the unable-or-
unwilling standard to be carried forward into the Refugee Act 
because of its use of the term “persecution.”81 Soon thereafter, federal 
circuit courts began to recognize that the Board in Acosta adopted the 
pre-1980 definition of “persecution” for the purpose of interpreting 
the Refugee Act, one of the required components of which is that the 
harm or suffering be inflicted either by the government of a country 
or by those the government is “unable or unwilling” to control.82 Since 
that time, every circuit in the country has followed suit.83 
What is not clear is why the more obvious statutory hook—
the “unable or unwilling to avail of . . . [state] protection because 
of . . . a well-founded fear” language—has not played a more 
significant role in understanding the nonstate actor doctrine in U.S. 
jurisprudence. As discussed further below, the interpretive choice to 
ground the nonstate actor doctrine in the term “persecution” carries 
grave risks for refugees, given that the statutory term “persecution” 
has almost invariably been recognized as an ambiguous one, such 
that the BIA’s reasonable interpretations of the term are owed great 
deference. 84  Even if concerns related to administrative law and 
                                                            
79.  Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 222–23 (emphasis added); see also 
Matter of McMullen, 17 I&N Dec. 542, 544–45 (B.I.A. 1980) (“We will, therefore, 
require under the new Act, as we did under the old law, that an alien must show 
either persecution by the government . . . , or . . . at the hands of an organization 
or person from which the government cannot or will not protect the alien.” 
(emphasis added)). 
80.  Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 222–23 (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 
U.S. 575, 581 (1978)). 
81.  Id. 
82.  Miranda v. INS, 139 F.3d 624, 626–27 (8th Cir. 1998). 
83.  See infra Part II. 
84.  See Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 333 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that it is 
when an applicant’s well-founded fear pertains to private violence that his ability 
to claim persecution depends on showing that the government is unwilling or 
unable to protect him against that violence); Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 890 
(D.C. Cir. 2020) (noting that the AG has reiterated that asylum seekers alleging 
non-state-actor persecution must show that their governments are “unable or 
unwilling to prevent” the persecution); Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 233 
(5th Cir. 2019) (noting that the “inability or unwillingness standard” requires that 
a noncitizen’s home government has “more than difficulty . . . controlling private 
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deference are put aside, the tendency to view the nonstate actor 
doctrine in isolation from the Refugee Convention’s and Refugee Act’s 
language—which link up the state protection and well-founded fear 
analyses—has amounted to higher hurdles for refugees to obtain 
protection in the United States. To understand why, it is necessary to 
discuss the well-founded fear analysis. 
D. Viewing State Protection Through the Lens of the Well-
Founded Fear Test 
When the term “well-founded fear of persecution” was first 
introduced in U.S. law, its meaning was not at all clear. Four years 
after the passage of the Refugee Act, the Supreme Court in INS v. 
Stevic clarified that to qualify for withholding of deportation, a 
noncitizen had to show that “it is more likely than not” that their “life 
or freedom would be threatened” if they were to be deported. 85 
However, a circuit split quickly developed over whether the “more 
likely than not” standard likewise applied to the well-founded fear 
requirement of requests for asylum.86 The BIA had held that the two 
standards were equivalent.87 And the government, in defending the 
agency decision in Cardoza-Fonseca, argued that “even though the 
‘well-founded fear’ standard is applicable [to requests for asylum], 
there is no difference between it and the ‘would be threatened’ test” of 
the withholding provision. 88  The government asserted that the 
agency’s interpretation of this ambiguous statutory term was entitled 
to Chevron deference.89 
The Court rejected the government’s arguments, “[e]mploying 
traditional tools of statutory construction,” to discern “that Congress 
did not intend the two standards to be identical.”90 The Court noted 
that “the reference to ‘fear’ in the . . . [asylum] standard obviously 
makes the eligibility determination turn to some extent on the 
subjective mental state of the” noncitizen, and that the “linguistic 
difference between the words” requires a conclusion that the 
standards are not the same.91 The Court explained that “[o]ne can 
                                                                                                                                     
behavior”); see also infra Part IV (mapping out the various challenges to A-B- and 
describing where those challenges have fallen short). 
85.  INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424, 425 (1984). 
86.  INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987). 
87.  Id. at 445. 
88.  Id. at 434. 
89.  Id. at 445–46. 
90.  Id. at 446. 
91.  Id. at 430–31. 
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certainly have a well-founded fear of an event happening when there 
is less than a 50% chance of the occurrence taking place,” and 
recognized that even a one-in-ten chance of persecution could produce 
a well-founded fear in a reasonable person.92 The Court also noted 
that “the [Refugee Act’s] legislative history . . . demonstrate[d] that 
Congress added the ‘well-founded’ language only because that was 
the language incorporated by the United Nations Protocol to which 
Congress sought to conform.”93 The Court underscored that “[i]f one 
thing is clear from the legislative history of the new definition of 
‘refugee,’ and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress’ 
primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into 
conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees . . . to which the United States acceded in 1968.”94 
In noting that the “definition of ‘refugee’ that Congress adopted . . . is 
virtually identical to the one prescribed by . . . the Convention,” the 
Court recognized “congress[ional] intent that the new statutory 
definition of ‘refugee’ be interpreted in conformance with the” Refugee 
Convention’s and Protocol’s definition.95 
In turning to international law authorities, the Court 
explained that the “origin of the Protocol’s definition of ‘refugee’ is 
found in the 1946 Constitution of the IRO, which “defined a ‘refugee’ 
as a person who had a ‘valid objection’ to returning to his country of 
nationality, and specified that ‘fear, based on reasonable grounds of 
persecution . . .’ constituted a valid objection.”96 The Committee that 
drafted the provision explained that “[t]he expression ‘well-founded 
fear of being the victim of persecution . . . ‘means that a person has 
either been . . . a victim of persecution or can show good reason why 
he fears persecution.”97 The term was incorporated into the Refugee 
Convention and Protocol.98 The Court noted that “[t]he standard, as it 
has been consistently understood by those who drafted it, as well as 
those drafting the documents that adopted it, certainly does not 
require . . . [a] show[ing] that it is more likely than not that [one] will 
be persecuted in order to be classified as a ‘refugee.’”99 Rather, in 
                                                            
92.  Id. at 431. 
93.  Id. at 434–35. 
94.  Id. at 436–37. 
95.  Id. at 437. 
96.  Id. (citing IRO CONST., annex 1, pt. 1, § C1(a)(i)). 
97.  Id. at 438 (citing U.N. Economic & Social Council, Rep. of the Ad Hoc 
Comm. on Statelessness and Related Problems, U.N. Doc. E/1618, E/AC.32/5, at 
39 (1950)). 
98.  Id. at 438 (citing Refugee Convention, supra note 42, art. 1). 
99.  Id. 
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consulting the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status, the Court explained that “[i]n general, the applicant’s 
fear should be considered well-founded if he can establish, to a 
reasonable degree, that his continued stay in his country of origin has 
become intolerable to him for the reasons stated in the definition, or 
would for the same reasons be intolerable if he returned there.”100 The 
Court thus ultimately found that “[t]here is simply no room in 
the . . . definition for concluding that because an applicant only has a 
10% chance of being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted, that he 
or she has no ‘well-founded fear’ of the event happening.”101 
Significantly, the Court noted that while “[t]here is obviously 
some ambiguity in a term like ‘well-founded fear,’ which can only be 
given concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case 
adjudication,” that conclusion did not eliminate a role for statutory 
construction.102 The Court explained that: 
[T]he plain language of the Act, its symmetry with the 
United Nations Protocol, and its legislative history, 
lead inexorably to the conclusion that to show a “well-
founded fear of persecution,” [a noncitizen] need not 
prove that it is more likely than not that he or she will 
be persecuted in his or her home country.103 
The Court could thus answer the question presented through the 
“ordinary canons of statutory construction.”104 
With the clarity that Cardoza-Fonseca provided, the Board 
reassessed the question as to the correct meaning of the term well-
founded fear and crafted the eponymous Mogharrabi test.105  That 
four-part test directs adjudicators to determine whether (1) the 
applicant possesses a protected characteristic the persecutor seeks to 
overcome, (2) the persecutor is aware that the applicant has that 
protected characteristic, (3) the persecutor is able to harm the 
applicant, and (4) the persecutor is inclined to harm the applicant.106 
                                                            
100. Id. at 439 (citing UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, Ch. II B(2)(a) §§ 37–42, U.N. Doc. 
HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (1979)). 
101. Id. at 440. Rather, the Court explained that “it is enough that 
persecution is a reasonable possibility.” Id. 
102.  Id. at 448. 
103.  Id. at 449. 
104.  Id. 
105.  Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439, 446 (B.I.A. 1987). 
106.  Id. 
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If this four-part test is satisfied, then the adjudicator may conclude 
that the applicant faces a reasonable possibility of future harm and 
thus has a well-founded fear.107 
Given that the nonstate actor doctrine similarly looks to a 
government’s ability and willingness to provide protection vis-a-vis a 
nongovernmental persecutor, there is a clear analogue between the 
nonstate actor doctrine and the well-founded fear analysis in the 
context of a nonstate persecutor. However, when the nonstate actor 
test is fashioned and applied in isolation from the well-founded fear 
analysis, as occurs in efforts to ground the doctrine in the term 
“persecution,” it “tends . . . to downplay and even . . . trump the 
individual’s fear of persecution, while giving preference to the state 
and its efforts to provide a reasonably effective and competent police 
and judicial system which operates compatibly with minimum 
international standards.”108 Put another way, if a person who has 
established a well-founded fear of future harm can lose their asylum 
claim when the government is making good faith but ineffective 
efforts to protect them, then such a nonstate actor requirement 
consumes Cardoza-Fonseca’s analysis. 
* * * 
When an elevated nonstate actor standard is imposed to 
require an applicant to show more than a reasonable possibility of 
future harm, these two elements of the refugee definition work at 
irreconcilable cross-purposes in contravention of both the Refugee 
Convention and Refugee Act. For this reason, we argue that the 
nonstate actor requirement must be interpreted consistently with the 
historical understanding of the state protection component as well as 
the rest of the refugee definition, and in particular the well-founded 
fear requirement. When the nonstate actor requirement is allowed to 
develop in isolation, it threatens to usurp the probability of harm 
analysis embedded in the well-founded fear requirement, rendering 
that “reasonable possibility” test a nullity. Indeed, the condone-or-
complete-helplessness standard represents the worst culmination of 
the nonstate actor analysis divorced from its original context, which 
clearly tethered considerations of state protection to the probability of 
harm. 
The next Part explores how the nonstate actor test developed 
prior to Matter of A-B- I and II. In particular, it notes how the agency 
and courts have both grounded the test in the term “persecution” and 
                                                            
107.  Id. at 444. 
108.  See GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 51, at 11. 
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have approached it as an insular inquiry, rather than a 
contextualized one most appropriately understood through the lens of 
the well-founded fear analysis. 
II. THE NONSTATE ACTOR STANDARD LEADING UP TO  
MATTER OF A-B- I AND II 
Prior to the AG’s decision in Matter of A-B- I, the unwilling-
or-unable standard was well-established with the BIA and all eleven 
federal courts of appeals. This Part sets forth the law of each court 
prior to the issuance of the Matter of A-B- I decision. This information 
serves as important context for the confusion created by the use of the 
condone-or-completely-helpless standard in Matter of A-B- I and the 
subsequent decisions. These cases also reveal the differences in the 
plain meaning of the words used in the two standards. 
In addition to canvassing the Board’s and courts’ treatment of 
the unable-or-unwilling test, this Part also reveals the agency’s and 
courts’ clear preference for anchoring that test in the term 
“persecution.” While we contend that the BIA’s and courts’ choice to 
adopt the unable-or-unwilling standard is correct, grounding that test 
in the term “persecution” created a latent vulnerability to future 
negative revisions—a vulnerability Matter of A-B- I and II exploited. 
A. The Board of Immigration Appeals 
Prior to the issuance of Matter of A-B- I, the BIA issued 
precedential decisions dating back more than forty years affirming 
that harms perpetrated by nonstate actors can constitute 
persecution. 109  As noted above, in Matter of Acosta, the Board 
recognized that in the Refugee Act, Congress carried forward the 
term “persecution” from pre-1980 statutes, where it had a well-settled 
judicial and administrative construction of meaning “harm or 
suffering . . . inflicted either by the government of a country or by 
persons or an organization that the government was unwilling or 
unable to control.”110 The BIA then applied the basic rule of statutory 
construction that when Congress carries forward a term that has an 
established meaning, it intends the same meaning to apply.111 
                                                            
109.  See, e.g., Matter of Pierre, 15 I&N Dec. 461, 462 (B.I.A. 1975); Matter 
of McMullen, 19 I&N Dec. 90, 96 (B.I.A. 1984). 
110.  Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985). 
111.  Id. at 223. 
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The BIA has recognized various types of harms inflicted by 
nonstate actors as persecution, including, but not limited to, 
murder, 112  beatings, 113  threats, 114  detention, 115  female genital 
cutting,116 and domestic abuse.117 For example, in Matter of O-Z- & I-
Z-, the applicants were persecuted by an anti-Semitic, pro-Ukrainian 
independence movement, unconnected with the Ukrainian 
government.118 The Board rejected the Service’s119 argument that the 
persecution needed to be “government directed or condoned,” 120 
instead concluding that government inaction was sufficient to show 
that “the Ukrainian Government was unable or unwilling to control 
the respondent’s attackers and protect him or his son from the anti-
Semitic acts of violence.”121 As the BIA apparently recognized, the 
police’s lack of action does not amount to “condoning” or “directing” 
the behavior, but it was nonetheless enough to satisfy the unwilling-
or-unable standard. 
The BIA similarly recognized the applicability of the 
unwilling-or-unable standard to claims based on domestic violence—
the very type of claim later addressed by the Attorney General in 
                                                            
112 .  See, e.g., Matter of Villalta, 20 I&N Dec. 142, 147 (B.I.A. 1990) 
(finding that the Salvadoran government appeared to be unable to control 
paramilitary death squads). 
113.  See, e.g., Matter of O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I&N Dec. 23, 25 (B.I.A. 1998) 
(finding that the applicant, who suffered repeated beatings and received multiple 
handwritten anti-Semitic threats, whose apartment was vandalized by anti-
Semitic nationalists, and whose son was subjected to degradation and 
intimidation, established that he had suffered harm which, in the aggregate, rose 
to the level of persecution). 
114.  See, e.g., id. at 25–26 (finding repeated threats, among other harms, 
sufficient). 
115.  See, e.g., Matter of H-, 21 I&N Dec. 337, 341 (B.I.A. 1996) (finding that 
the applicant, who had been detained as a result of interclan violence, had 
suffered persecution). 
116 .  See, e.g., Matter of Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996) 
(holding that female genital mutilation constitutes persecution); see also Matter of 
S-A-K- & H-A-H-, 24 I&N Dec. 464, 465 (B.I.A. 2008) (finding that applicant, who 
was “forcibly circumcised by women brought home by her father when she was 9 
years old,” had experienced persecution). 
117.  See, e.g., Matter of S-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 1328, 1335 (B.I.A. 2000) (holding 
that applicant’s abuse at the hands of her orthodox Muslim father amounted to 
persecution). 
118.  Matter of O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I&N Dec. at 24. 
119.  At the time this case was decided, the relevant government agency 
was not the Department of Homeland Security, but rather the now-defunct 
Immigration and Naturalization Service. 
120.  Matter of O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I&N Dec. at 25. 
121.  Id. at 26. 
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Matter of A-B- I. In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the applicant was abused by 
her husband, who beat her weekly, broke her nose, burned her breast, 
and raped her.122 The IJ denied relief, and the BIA reversed, holding 
that she had demonstrated persecution on account of her membership 
in a particular social group.123 The BIA reaffirmed a longstanding 
principle that harms committed by nonstate actors constitute 
persecution when the applicant demonstrates that the government 
was “unwilling or unable to control the ‘private’ actor.”124 Similarly, in 
Matter of S-A-, the BIA held in favor of the applicant, holding that the 
physical assaults, imposed isolation, and deprivation of education 
perpetrated by her own father constituted persecution where 
Moroccan authorities would have been unable or unwilling to protect 
her.125 
Finally, the BIA has found persecution where a victim’s 
family forces them to undergo female genital cutting and the 
government is “ineffective” at preventing it. In Matter of Kasinga, the 
applicant’s aunt and husband would have forced her to undergo 
genital cutting had she not fled Togo.126 The applicant testified that 
the government of Togo would have taken no steps to protect her, and 
the BIA accordingly held that these actions constituted persecution.127 
In so doing, it explicitly recognized the unwilling-or-unable 
standard.128 
Even when the BIA has decided against the applicant, it has 
acknowledged that harms inflicted by nonstate actors can constitute 
persecution. For example, in Matter of McMullen, the BIA stated that 
“the persecution contemplated under the Act is not limited to the 
conduct of organized governments, but may, under certain 
circumstances, be committed by individuals or nongovernmental 
organizations.”129 It recognized that the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army (“PIRA”) was a terrorist organization that the government was 
unable to control.130 It denied McMullen asylum only because he was 
himself a member of PIRA and had persecuted others.131 
                                                            
122.  Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388, 389 (B.I.A. 2014). 
123.  Id. at 389–90. 
124.  Id. at 395. 
125.  Matter of S-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 1328, 1335 (B.I.A. 2000). 
126.  Matter of Kasinga¸ 21 I&N Dec. 357, 358–59 (B.I.A. 1996). 
127.  Id. at 359, 368. 
128.  Id. at 365. 
129.  Matter of McMullen, 19 I&N Dec. 91, 95 (B.I.A. 1984). 
130.  Id. at 94. 
131.  Id. at 99. 
470 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [52.2 
B. The Federal Courts of Appeals 
Before the issuance of Matter of A-B- I, every single federal 
court of appeals had held that harms inflicted by nonstate actors can 
qualify as persecution, so long as the government is “unwilling or 
unable” to control the harm.132 Here, too, we observe both a strong 
consensus in favor of the unable-or-unwilling test, as well as a 
widespread tendency to follow the Board’s lead in using the term 
“persecution” as the statutory hook for that standard. The relevant 
case law from each circuit is summarized below. 
1. First Circuit 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has long 
recognized the unwilling-or-unable standard.133 In Kadri v. Mukasey, 
for example, the IJ determined that the treatment the applicant had 
experienced in his workplace on account of his sexual orientation 
constituted persecution. 134  The First Circuit remanded the BIA’s 
denial of asylum and reiterated the IJ’s initial reliance on the 
established principle that harms committed by nonstate actors can 
constitute persecution when there is a “showing that the persecution 
is due to the government’s unwillingness or inability to control the 
conduct of private actors.” 135  In Khattak v. Holder, the court 
considered the application of a Pakistani family who had been 
threatened by the Taliban.136 The IJ held, and the BIA affirmed, that 
the family failed to establish that the Pakistani government was 
unwilling or unable to control the Taliban because the government 
“was in fact taking on the Taliban” through military action and was 
                                                            
132.   As there are no immigration courts located in the District of Columbia 
Circuit, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had no occasion 
to review the nonstate actor standard prior to the issuance of Matter of A-B-. See 
EOIR Immigration Court Listing, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. https://www.justice.gov/ 
eoir/eoir-immigration-court-listing [https://perma.cc/RLP2-UEAA]. 
133.  See, e.g., Aldana-Ramos v. Holder, 757 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing 
Ivanov v. Holder, 736 F.3d 5, 12 (1st Cir. 2013) for government's unwillingness or 
inability to control private conduct); Sok v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 48, 53 (1st Cir. 
2008) (citing Nikijuluw v. Gonzáles, 427 F.3d 115, 121 (1st Cir. 2005) for the 
unwilling-or-unable standard). 
134.  Kadri v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2008). 
135.  Kadri, 543 F.3d at 20 (citing Jorgji v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 53, 57 (1st 
Cir. 2008)); see also Orelien v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 67, 72 (1st Cir. 2006) (providing 
that asylum seekers must show mistreatment that is the direct result of 
“government action, government-supported action, or government’s unwillingness 
or inability to control private conduct”). 
136.  Khattak v. Holder, 704 F.3d 197, 200 (1st Cir. 2013). 
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“making inroads.”137 On appeal, the First Circuit held that “although 
such military action indicates that the Pakistani government is 
willing to take on the Taliban, such action does not show that the 
Pakistani government is able to protect its citizens from Taliban 
attacks.”138 
Even when the court has ruled against the applicant, it has 
nonetheless acknowledged that harms inflicted by nonstate actors can 
constitute persecution. In Guaman-Loja v. Holder, for example, the 
court set forth the unwilling-or-unable rule, but found that the 
petitioner failed to show government inability or unwillingness to 
control assaults by members of an indigenous tribe.139 In Vega-Ayala 
v. Lynch, a more recent domestic violence case, the court set forth the 
unwilling-or-unable standard, but found that, unlike the applicant in 
Matter of A-R-C-G-, Vega-Ayala had not shown that her persecution 
was on account of a protected category.140 
Thus, prior to A-B- I, the court clearly recognized the 
unwilling-or-unable standard as the proper standard for assessing 
nonstate actor claims. Numerous unpublished decisions from the 
First Circuit pre-Matter of A-B- I establish the same.141 
2. Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals also has consistently 
held that harms inflicted by nonstate actors may constitute 
                                                            
137 .  Id. at 203. In several of the circuit court cases described in this 
Section, the BIA initially found that the applicant had not shown that the 
government was unwilling or unable to protect that applicant. However, this fact 
does not cut against the argument that the BIA has historically recognized and 
applied the unwilling-or-unable standard and not the more onerous condone-or-
completely-helpless test. In each of these cases, the BIA set forth and applied the 
unwilling-or-unable test. In some, the courts of appeals agreed with the BIA’s 
analysis, and in others they disagreed and remanded. Although the authors argue 
that the unwilling-or-unable test is less burdensome than the condone-or-
completely-helpless test, the authors do not mean to suggest that the unwilling-
or-unable test will always be satisfied. Indeed, there may be cases in which the 
courts or agency might legitimately find that the applicant did not meet their 
burden to show that their government was unwilling or unable to protect them 
from the persecution. 
138.  Id. at 206. 
139.  Guaman-Loja v. Holder, 707 F.3d 119, 123–24 (1st Cir. 2013). 
140.  Vega-Ayala v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2016). 
141.  For First Circuit cases that apply the unwilling-or-unable standard 
see, e.g., Rodriguez v. Lynch, 654 F. App’x 498, 500 (1st Cir. 2016); Mawa v. 
Holder, 569 F. App’x 2, 4 (1st Cir. 2014); Barzoia Becerra v. Holder, 323 F. App’x 
1, 2 (1st Cir. 2009); Kamuh v. Mukasey, 280 F. App’x 7, 10 (1st Cir. 2008). 
472 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [52.2 
persecution so long as the government is unwilling or unable to 
control the conduct.142 The Second Circuit has recognized persecution 
committed at the hands of various nonstate actors, including, inter 
alia, domestic abusers,143 rebel guerilla groups,144 religious groups,145 
tribe members,146 members of other ethnic groups,147 anti-Semites,148 
and traffickers.149 Further, it has stated that a government’s inability 
or unwillingness to control nonstate persecutors can be corroborated 
by a showing of authorities’ failure to respond,150 lack of resources,151 
corruption or impunity, 152  or societal pervasiveness of the 
persecution.153 
In Ivanishvili v. Department of Justice, the Second Circuit 
remanded the case because it found that the IJ failed to consider the 
applicant’s testimony that authorities and unknown nonstate actors 
violently attacked her and other church members. 154  The court 
emphasized that “even assuming the perpetrators of these assaults 
were not acting on orders from the Georgian government, it is well 
established that private acts may be persecution if the government 
has proved unwilling to control such actions.”155 
Similarly, in Aliyev v. Mukasey, the Second Circuit remanded 
a BIA decision that affirmed an IJ’s denial of asylum to a family of 
ethnic Uyghurs from Kazakhstan.156 After a Kazakh nationalist group 
threatened and beat the father, he filed a report with the police.157 
The police sent him to the hospital for an examination and injury 
report, yet never conducted a proper investigation.158 After the family 
                                                            
142.  See, e.g., Pan v. Holder, 777 F.3d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding acts 
by private actors can constitute persecution if the government is unable or 
unwilling to control them); Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(recognizing that private acts may be persecution if the government is unwilling 
to control the actions). 
143.  Bori v. INS, 190 F. App’x 17, 19 (2d Cir. 2006). 
144.  Del Pilar Delgado v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 702, 707 (2d Cir. 2007). 
145.  Rizal, 442 F.3d at 92. 
146.  Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18, 26 (2d Cir. 1999). 
147.  Aliyev v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2008). 
148.  Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 81 (2d Cir. 2005). 
149.  Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 198–99 (2d Cir. 2014). 
150.  Pavlova v. INS, 441 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2006). 
151.  Sotelo-Aquije v. Slattery, 17 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir.1994). 
152.  Poradisova, 420 F.3d at 81. 
153.  Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18, 25–26 (2d Cir. 1999). 
154.  Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 433 F.3d 332, 342–43 (2d. Cir. 2006). 
155.  Id. at 342. 
156.  Aliyev v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2008). 
157.  Id. at 114. 
158.  Id. 
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reported that their home was destroyed by an explosion, a local 
sheriff came to the home, but did nothing further.159 The court held 
that the BIA improperly failed to consider that the applicant had 
“clearly introduced enough evidence to forge the link between private 
conduct and public responsibility.”160 Plainly, in the court’s view, an 
asylum seeker could meet the nonstate standard even if the police 
provided some level of support. 
Further still, decisions from the Second Circuit demonstrate 
that asylum seekers can meet the “unable or unwilling” standard 
even if they never reported nonstate actor violence to the police. In 
Pan v. Holder, the court held that the BIA improperly ignored 
“ample” evidence of the government’s unwillingness to help, including 
a country report and evidence regarding the police’s refusal to help a 
similarly situated refugee.161 Likewise, in Bori v. INS, the court held 
that an IJ failed to take into account an Albanian asylum seeker’s 
reasons for not reporting domestic abuse to the government.162 In 
particular, the IJ did not consider a country report that stated that 
the majority of spousal abuse goes unreported as a result of lax police 
responses.163 In these two cases, the Second Circuit made clear that, 
far from needing to introduce direct evidence of the government’s 
“condoning” the persecution or its “complete helplessness” to stop it, 
the applicant need only introduce circumstantial evidence indicating 
that the government is unlikely to have protected the applicant had 
they reported. Several unpublished decisions also demonstrate the 
court’s longstanding recognition of the unwilling-or-unable standard 
prior to Matter of A-B- I.164 
                                                            
159.  Id. 
160.  Id. at 118. 
161.  Pan v. Holder, 777 F.3d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 2015). 
162.  Bori v. INS, 190 F. App’x 17, 19 (2d Cir. 2006). 
163.  Id. 
164.  Prior to the Matter of A-B- I decision, the Second Circuit consistently 
recognized the unwilling-or-unable standard. See, e.g., Martinez-Segova v. 
Sessions, 696 F. App’x 12, 14 (2d Cir. 2017); Sutiono v. Lynch, 611 F. App’x 738, 
740 (2d Cir. 2015); Farook v. Holder, 407 F. App’x 545, 547 (2d Cir. 2011); Cortez 
v. Holder, 363 F. App’x 829, 831 (2d Cir. 2010); Gjicali v. Mukasey, 260 F. App’x 
360, 362 (2d Cir. 2008); Ketaren v. Mukasey, 269 F. App’x 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2008); 
Jasaraj-Hot v. Gonzales, 217 F. App’x 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2007); Camara v. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., 218 F. App’x 61, 64 (2d Cir. 2007); Hussain v. Gonzales, 228 F. 
App’x 101, 102 (2d Cir. 2007); Mikhailenko v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. 
Servs., 228 F. App’x 41, 43 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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3. Third Circuit 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently 
recognized that persecution can be committed “by forces the 
government is unable or unwilling to control.”165 A prime example is 
Fiadjoe v. Attorney General, in which the court remanded a BIA 
decision denying a Ghanaian woman’s applications for asylum and 
CAT relief based on her abuse and enslavement in accordance with 
the tenets of the Trokosi sect. 166  Ghana had passed legislation 
banning the practice of “customary servitude,” and working with an 
NGO, helped release 2,800 Trokosi slaves. 167  Despite these policy 
changes, the court found that the BIA “totally ignored the evidence in 
the record that establishes the deep hold that the Trokosi religion has 
upon substantial elements of the Ghanaian people” even after Trokosi 
slavery was outlawed.168 This case demonstrates that an applicant 
could satisfy the “unable or unwilling” standard even when a 
government passes legislation outlawing the form of persecution 
faced by an asylum seeker, clearly revealing that the government did 
not “condone” the practice and was not “completely helpless” to stop 
it. Similarly, in Garcia v. Attorney General, the court found 
persecution where the Guatemalan government was unable to protect 
the applicant, a criminal witness who testified against violent gang 
members.169 
Even where the Third Circuit has ruled against the asylum 
applicant, it has nonetheless recognized that harms inflicted by 
nonstate actors can constitute persecution.170 In none of these cases 
did the court rule against the applicant on the basis that harms 
inflicted by nonstate actors do not constitute persecution.171 Moreover, 
numerous unpublished decisions from the circuit also demonstrate 
                                                            
165.  Fiadjoe v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 411 F.3d 135, 160 (3d Cir. 2005); see also 
Garcia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 503 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying the 
unwilling-or-unable framework); Espinosa-Cortez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 607 F.3d 101, 
113 (3d Cir. 2010) (recognizing the unwilling-or-unable standard); Vente v. 
Gonzales, 415 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2005) (same). 
166.  Fiadjoe, 411 F.3d at 160, 163. 
167.  Id. at 139. 
168.  Id. at 161. 
169.  Garcia, 665 F.3d at 500, 503. 
170.  See, e.g., Ndayshimiye v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 124, 132 (3d Cir. 
2009) (finding that the abuse applicant suffered from his aunt was the product of 
a land dispute and not on account of a protected ground); Chen v. Gonzales, 434 
F.3d 212, 221–22 (3d Cir. 2005) (denying relief on credibility grounds). 
171.  Ndayshimiye, 557 F.3d at 133; Chen, 434 F.3d at 221–22 (denying 
relief on other grounds). 
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that it is well-established that harms inflicted by nonstate actors can 
constitute persecution.172 
4. Fourth Circuit 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has long recognized the 
unwilling-or-unable standard.173 In Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, for 
example, a Salvadoran applicant witnessed four members of MS-13 
flee the scene after fatally shooting his cousin.174 He described the 
four men to the police.175 Two weeks later, the police arrested two of 
the men.176 As the murder trial approached, gang members told the 
applicant’s uncle that they would kill him if he continued to 
                                                            
172.  The following cases are just some of those in which the Third Circuit 
has held that persecution need not directly arise from state-created harm: Emran 
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 801 F. App’x 841, 845 (3d Cir. 2020); Bera v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
555 F. App’x 129, 132 (3d Cir. 2014); Kesuma v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 555 F. App’x 123, 
124 (3d Cir. 2014); Pitel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 528 F. App’x 172, 174 (3d Cir. 2013); 
Kuruca v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 547 F. App’x 126, 129 (3d Cir. 2013); Ferreira v. U.S. 
Att’y Gen., 513 F. App’x 184, 188 (3d Cir. 2013); Ball v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 479 F. 
App’x 443, 443 (3d Cir. 2012); Haxhari v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 459 F. App’x 140, 143 
(3d Cir. 2012); Cardozo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 505 F. App’x 135, 137 (3d Cir. 2012); 
Xing Qiang Zhuo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 502 F. App’x 176, 178 (3d Cir. 2012); Dolley v. 
U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F. App’x 121, 124 (3d Cir. 2011); Mahadeo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
455 F. App’x 274, 276 (3d Cir. 2011); Lopez-Perez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 447 F. App’x 
370, 375 (3d Cir. 2011); Abazaj v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 443 F. App’x 725, 729 (3d Cir. 
2011); Paprskarz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 360 F. App’x 283, 286 (3d Cir. 2010); Ngo v. 
U.S. Att’y Gen., 350 F. App’x 714, 717 (3d Cir. 2009); Sze Fung Cheng v. U.S. Att’y 
Gen., 312 F. App’x 460, 463 (3d Cir. 2008); Massaquoi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 313 F. 
App’x 483, 485 (3d Cir. 2008); Soesilo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 239 F. App’x 703, 704 (3d 
Cir. 2007); Suherwanto v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 230 F. App’x 211, 215 (3d Cir. 2007); 
Setiawan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 237 F. App’x 728, 731 (3d Cir. 2007); Susanto v. U.S. 
Att’y Gen., 244 F. App’x 492, 495 (3d Cir. 2007); Wijaya v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 172 F. 
App’x 411, 412 (3d Cir. 2006); Rehman v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 178 F. App’x 126, 128 
(3d Cir. 2006); Lie v. Sec’y of Dept. of Homeland Sec., 121 F. App’x 453, 457 (3d 
Cir. 2005); Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 151 F. App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2005).  
173.  See, e.g., Zavaleta-Policiano v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 241, 246 (4th Cir. 
2017) (holding that an asylum applicant must show persecution by an entity that 
the government is unable or unwilling to control); Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 
784 F.3d 944, 949 (4th Cir. 2015) (finding that El Salvador was unwilling and 
unable to protect the petitioner); Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 128 
(4th Cir. 2011) (remanding the BIA’s denial of asylum in part because the 
petitioner showed the El Salvadoran government was unable or unwilling to 
control MS-13’s activities); Mulyani v. Holder, 771 F.3d 190, 198 (4th Cir. 2014) 
(denying asylum because the BIA had strong evidence the Indonesian government 
was not unwilling or unable to protect the applicant from religious persecution). 
174.  632 F.3d 117, 120 (4th Cir. 2011). 
175.  Id. 
176.  Id. 
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cooperate.177 The prosecutor provided the uncle with police protection, 
but because the applicant did not directly witness the murder, he did 
not receive police protection.178 A court convicted both defendants, 
and the gang members continued to threaten him until he fled to the 
United States.179 
The BIA concluded that a State Department report 
“demonstrates that the Salvadoran government has focused law 
enforcement efforts on suppressing gang violence.”180 On that basis, 
the BIA found that the applicant had not shown “that the government 
would be unable or unwilling to protect them from MS-13.”181 The 
Fourth Circuit remanded because the BIA erred in failing to consider 
that “attempts by the Salvadoran government to control gang 
violence have proved futile.”182 The Salvadoran government’s efforts 
to control gang violence demonstrate that the government neither 
condoned the violence nor was completely helpless to control it; 
nevertheless, the court granted the petition for review out of a 
recognition that the government’s efforts were ineffective.183 
In like manner, in Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, the Fourth 
Circuit concluded that the Mara 18 gang persecuted a mother based 
on family ties. 184  The court found that a human rights report 
corroborating corruption within the Salvadoran judicial system 
showed that the Salvadoran government was unwilling or unable to 
protect the mother from the Mara 18.185 
Fourth Circuit cases in which the court decided against the 
applicant do not lead to a different conclusion.186  In Velasquez v. 
Sessions, despite denying the petition, the court explicitly recognized 
that harms perpetrated by “an organization that the Honduran 
                                                            
177.  Id. 
178.  Id. 
179.  Id. 
180.  Id. at 128. 
181.  Id. 
182.  Id. 
183.  See also Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944, 952–53 (4th Cir. 
2015) (granting petition for review where the BIA was motivated by its “faulty 
conclusion that the Salvadoran government would have been willing to prosecute 
the gang members who threatened [the applicant]”). 
184.  Id. at 949–50. 
185.  Id. at 952–53. 
186.    See, e.g., Mulyani v. Holder, 771 F.3d 190, 200 (4th Cir. 2014) 
(acknowledging the unwilling-or-unable standard, but finding that the standard 
was not met because the applicant did not attempt to go to the police regarding 
the incidents in which she was attacked and noting that the government had 
successfully prosecuted similar cases). 
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government ‘is unable or unwilling to control’” could constitute 
persecution. 187  It denied relief not because of a rejection of the 
unwilling-or-unable standard, but because the applicant had not 
shown that the harm she feared would occur on account of her 
membership in a particular social group, namely her nuclear 
family.188 Instead, the court found that the reason for the feared harm 
was a dispute over the custody of a child.189 Accordingly, the court 
denied relief based on a finding that the applicant had failed to prove 
nexus to a protected ground, and not because of any rule change on 
the nonstate actor standard. 
Unpublished cases in the Fourth Circuit also show that, prior 
to Matter of A-B- I, it was well established in the circuit that harms 
inflicted by nonstate actors could constitute persecution under the 
unwilling-or-unable standard.190 Indeed, the court’s decision not to 
publish these cases demonstrates just how well-established this 
proposition was. 
5. Fifth Circuit 
Prior to Matter of A-B- I, it was similarly well-established in 
the Fifth Circuit that “persecution entails harm inflicted . . . by the 
government or by forces that a government is unable or unwilling to 
control.”191 In Eduard v. Ashcroft, the court granted the petition of an 
applicant who was “afraid to go back to Indonesia because Christians 
                                                            
187.  Velasquez v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 188, 194 (4th Cir. 2017). 
188.  Id. at 196. 
189.  Id. at 195–96. 
190.  See, e.g., Villatoro v. Sessions, 680 F. App’x 212, 220–22 (4th Cir. 
2017) (granting petition for review where applicant had a well-founded fear of 
persecution from gang members because of her relationship to her father and 
brother); Mazzi v. Lynch, 662 F. App’x 227, 234, 236 (4th Cir. 2016) (granting 
petition for review because IJ erred in only considering the fact that government 
prohibited female genital cutting without looking at defiance of those laws); 
Banegas-Rivera v. Lynch, 664 F. App’x 296, 297 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding that the 
petitioner failed to show the government was unwilling or unable to control the 
abuser); Diaz v. INS, No. 92-2167, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 29530, at *6–7 (4th Cir. 
Nov. 15, 1993) (finding that the petitioner failed to show that the government was 
unwilling or unable to control the group from which the petitioner feared 
persecution). 
191.  Tesfamichael v. Gonzalez, 469 F.3d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 2006) (emphasis 
added); see also Eduard v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182, 187 (5th Cir. 2004) (using the 
“unable or unwilling” language); Adebisi v. INS, 952 F.2d 910, 914 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(affirming denial of asylum because the applicant could not show that the 
government was unable or unwilling to control the persecutors). 
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are being persecuted there by the Moslems and the Indonesian 
government cannot control them.”192 
Even when denying relief, the court explicitly recognized that 
harms inflicted by nonstate actors can constitute persecution.193 For 
example, in Adebisi v. INS, the applicant feared persecution at the 
hands of his tribe members but never sought police protection 
“because of his fear of the Esubete elders and their voodoo powers.”194 
In denying the petition, the court nonetheless recognized that “the 
BIA extends the qualifying range of persecution fear to include acts 
by groups ‘the government is unable or unwilling to control.’”195 
As in other jurisdictions, unpublished cases in the Fifth 
Circuit further demonstrate that, prior to Matter of A-B- I, it was well 
settled that harms inflicted by nonstate actors could constitute 
persecution, so long as the applicant could show that the government 
was “unable or unwilling” to control them.196 
6. Sixth Circuit 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently 
recognized the unwilling-or-unable standard. 197  For example, in 
                                                            
192.  Eduard, 379 F.3d at 190. 
193.  See, e.g., Tesfamichael, 469 F.3d at 113 (noting that persecution also 
entails harm inflicted by forces the government is unable or unwilling to control); 
Adebisi, 952 F.2d at 914 (same). 
194.  Adebisi, 952 F.2d at 914. 
195.  Id. While it is true that the court in Shehu v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 435, 
437 (5th Cir. 2006), briefly quoted the condone-or-complete-helplessness language 
from a Seventh Circuit decision (discussed in further detail below), the Shehu case 
dealt with violence not at the hands of nonstate actors, but at the hands of a 
government that had since changed from being dominated by Serbs to being 
dominated by the U.N. Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo and Provisional 
Institutions of Self Government. Shehu, 443 F.3d at 437–38. Accordingly, the real 
issue before the court was whether country conditions had changed such that the 
applicant no longer had a well-founded fear of persecution, not whether the state 
action requirement had been met. 
196.  See, e.g., Venturini v. Mukasey, 272 F. App’x 397, 402 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(stating that past persecution can entail harm inflicted by forces the government 
is unable or unwilling to control); Gomez v. Gonzales, 163 F. App’x 268, 272 (5th 
Cir. 2006) (finding that persecution can occur at the hands of private persons 
when the government is unable or unwilling to intervene); Manjee v. Holder, 544 
F. App’x 571, 575 (5th Cir. 2006) (stating that the harm in question could be 
suffered at the hands of forces the government is unable or unwilling to control).  
197.     See, e.g., Kamar v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 811, 818 (6th Cir. 2017) 
(acknowledging that persecution can be by those the government is unable or 
unwilling to control); Marouf v. Lynch, 811 F.3d 174, 189 (6th Cir. 2016) (stating 
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Kamar v. Sessions, a Jordanian asylum seeker feared that her 
cousins would subject her to an honor killing because she “shamed” 
her family by divorcing her husband and conceiving a child while 
unmarried.198 The BIA affirmed the IJ’s finding that the Jordanian 
government was not unable or unwilling to protect her, crediting a 
2011 country report that stated that the authorities in Jordan had 
placed eighty-two women in “protective custody” that year to prevent 
them from becoming victims of honor killings.199 The BIA also held 
that subsequent country reports demonstrated that the Jordanian 
government was actively protecting victims and prosecuting the 
perpetrators of honor crimes. 200  The court reversed, finding that 
“governors in Jordan routinely abuse the law and use imprisonment 
to protect potential victims of honor crimes.’” 201  Meanwhile, the 
Jordanian government frequently reduced sentences for perpetrators 
of honor killings or dismissed cases if the victim’s family (who is also 
often the perpetrator’s family) did not press charges.202 Clearly, the 
court was employing the “unable or unwilling” standard, and not the 
heightened standard, as the Jordanian government was not 
“completely helpless” to protect women from honor killings. Its 
protections were merely ineffective. 
Similarly, in Marouf v. Lynch, where the applicants, who 
were Christian, were repeatedly attacked by Muslim individuals,203 
the court held that a violent attack on the basis of religion amounts to 
past persecution, even if perpetrated by civilians.204 In its decision, 
the court noted that a State Department report showed that the 
Palestinian Authority was unable or unwilling to control the Muslim 
persecutors.205 
Even when denying relief, the Sixth Circuit has explicitly 
recognized the unwilling-or-unable standard. In both Bonilla-Morales 
v. Holder and Khalili v. Holder, the court defined persecution as “the 
infliction of harm or suffering by the government, or persons the 
                                                                                                                                     
that discrimination, harassment, and violence by groups the government is 
unwilling or unable to control can constitute persecution). 
198.  Kamar, 875 F.3d at 818–20. 
199.  Id. at 816. 
200.  Id. 
201.  Id. at 819 (quoting Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 659 (7th Cir. 
2011)). 
202.  Id. 
203.  Marouf, 811 F.3d at 178. 
204.  Id. at 189. 
205.  Id. 
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government is unwilling or unable to control.”206 The court has also 
recognized the unwilling-or-unable standard in several unpublished 
decisions.207 
7. Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has likewise long 
recognized the unwilling-or-unable standard. 208  For example, in 
Sarhan v. Holder, a Jordanian asylum seeker feared that her brother 
would subject her to an honor killing based on a false rumor that she 
had committed adultery.209 The IJ denied her claim, finding that the 
Jordanian government would protect the applicant if her brother 
posed a threat, and the BIA affirmed.210 On appeal, the government 
argued that in 2007 there were only seventeen reported instances of 
honor killings, and all seventeen honor crimes were prosecuted.211 
The court found these arguments unconvincing and reversed the BIA, 
reasoning that “[p]rosecution at times is an empty gesture.” 212  It 
stated that the six-month prison sentences amounted to “little more 
than a slap on the wrist” and sent a “strong social message of 
toleration for the practice.”213 After reviewing this and other evidence, 
the court concluded it was “at a loss to understand” how the BIA held 
that the record does not establish that the Jordanian government 
                                                            
206.  Bonilla-Morales v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1132, 1136 (6th Cir. 2010); Khalili 
v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 436 (6th Cir. 2009). 
207.  See, e.g., Abdramane v. Holder, 569 F. App’x 430, 436 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(applying the unwilling-or-unable standard when determining asylum eligibility); 
Anyakudo v. Holder, 375 F. App’x 559, 564 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding the applicant 
did not demonstrate he was persecuted by government officials or actors the 
government was unwilling or unable to control); El Ghorbi v. Mukasey, 281 F. 
App’x 514, 516 (6th Cir. 2008) (determining the applicant did not prove 
persecution under the unwilling-or-unable standard); Berishaj v. Gonzales, 238 F. 
App’x 57, 61 (6th Cir. 2007) (using the unwilling-or-unable standard in an asylum 
determination); Keita v. Gonzales, 175 F. App’x 711, 713 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding 
that unwillingness or inability on the part of the government was not proven by 
the asylum applicant). 
208.  For cases applying the unwilling-or-unable standard to a variety of 
fact patterns, including persecution on the basis of sex, religion, and social group 
membership, see, e.g., R.R.D. v. Holder, 746 F.3d 807, 809 (7th Cir. 2014); Cece v. 
Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 675 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Tariq v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 650, 
656 (7th Cir. 2007); Chakir v. Gonzalez, 466 F.3d 563, 569–70 (7th Cir. 2006). 
209.  Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 2011). 
210.  Id. at 652. 
211.  Id. at 658. 
212.  Id. 
213.  Id. 
2021] Unwilling or Unable? 481 
would be unable or unwilling to protect the applicant. 214  The 
Jordanian government might have been ineffective at protecting the 
applicant, but it could hardly be characterized as “completely 
helpless” given that it prosecuted all seventeen reported instances of 
honor killings in 2007.215 
Even when denying petitions for review, the Seventh Circuit 
has recognized that persecution could be inflicted by nonstate actors. 
For example, in Kaharudin v. Gonzales, the court recognized that the 
applicant must prove that the government is unable or unwilling to 
control the persecutor, but denied the applicant’s petition because the 
record did not demonstrate that the Indonesian government was 
unable or unwilling to protect ethnic Chinese Christians against acts 
of violence perpetrated by native Indonesians.216 Several unpublished 
cases in the circuit also demonstrate the court’s longstanding 
recognition of the unwilling-or-unable standard.217 
Despite the Seventh Circuit’s adherence to the unwilling-or-
unable standard, the AG’s decision in Matter of A-B- I cited two 
Seventh Circuit decisions in support of the condone-or-completely-
helpless standard. The condone-or-completely-helpless language 
originated in Galina v. INS, in which the court stated that “a finding 
of persecution ordinarily requires a determination that government 
authorities, if they did not actually perpetrate or incite the 
persecution, condoned it or at least demonstrated a complete 
helplessness to protect the victims.”218 However, none of the cases that 
the court cited in support of this proposition contain the condone-or-
completely-helpless language, and the court did nothing further to 
explain where the language came from. 219  Similarly, in Hor v. 
Gonzalez, relying on Galina, the court recognized that an applicant 
cannot claim asylum on the basis of “persecution by a private group 
unless the government either condones it or is helpless to prevent it, 
                                                            
214.  Id. at 660. 
215.  Sarhan, 658 F.3d at 660. 
216.  Kaharudin v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 619, 623–25 (7th Cir. 2007). 
217.  For cases recognizing that asylum applicants must show that their 
home countries were unwilling or unable to offer them protection, see, e.g., 
Abdelghani v. Holder, 309 F. App’x 19, 21 (7th Cir. 2009); Rupey v. Mukasey, 304 
F. App’x 453, 455 (7th Cir. 2008); Yaylacicegi v. Gonzalez, 175 F. App’x 33, 36 (7th 
Cir. 2006); Lleshanaku v. Ashcroft, 100 F. App’x 546, 548 (7th Cir. 2004); Esquivel 
v. Ashcroft, 105 F. App’x 99, 100 (7th Cir. 2004). 
218.  Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). 
219.  See Bucur v. INS, 109 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 1997); Hengan v. INS, 
79 F.3d 60, 62 (7th Cir. 1996); Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 735 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(en banc); Aguilar-Solis v. INS, 168 F.3d 565, 573 (1st Cir. 1999). 
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but if either of those conditions is satisfied, the claim is a good one.”220 
Notably, however, in both Galina and Hor, the court held that the 
petitioners had established the state action requirement despite the 
fact that the police took some actions to protect them (albeit 
ineffectively), 221  because they demonstrated that, despite the 
language the court used to describe the standard, the standard the 
court actually applied was the unable-or-unwilling standard and not 
the heightened condone-or-completely-helpless standard that the AG 
applied in Matter of A-B- I. Moreover, the vast majority of Seventh 
Circuit cases decided after Galina and Hor, such as Sarhan, set forth 
and apply only the unwilling-or-unable standard.222 
                                                            
220.  Hor v. Gonzalez, 400 F.3d 482, 485 (7th Cir. 2005), rev’d on reh’g, 421 
F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 2005). The AG’s decision in A-B- I cited the original 
hearing of this case, in which a panel of the court denied the applicant’s motion 
for a stay of removal, reasoning that “the probability of success on the merits 
[was] low.” Hor, 400 F.3d at 485. In the second Hor decision, however, the merits 
panel disagreed and granted the applicant’s petition for review. Hor, 421 F.3d at 
502. 
221.  Hor, 421 F.3d at 499; Galina, 213 F.3d at 958. 
222.  See, e.g., N.L.A. v. Holder, 744 F.3d 425, 440 (7th Cir. 2014) (granting 
the petition of a Colombian asylum seeker because the Colombian government 
was unwilling or unable to protect her from FARC); R.R.D. v. Holder, 746 F.3d 
807, 809 (7th Cir. 2014) (granting the petition for review where the BIA failed to 
consider whether the Mexican government was unable or unwilling to protect an 
“honest police” officer from organized crime); Vahora v. Holder, 707 F.3d 904, 908 
(7th Cir. 2013) (denying the petition for review because the petitioner, by failing 
to seek out police protection, did not meet the unwilling-or-unable standard); Cece 
v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 675 (7th Cir. 2013) (granting the applicant’s petition 
because the Albanian government was unwilling or unable to protect her from 
criminal gangs and prostitution rings); Bitsin v. Holder, 719 F.3d 619, 628 (7th 
Cir. 2013) (denying a Bulgarian asylum-seeker’s petition, in part because the 
petitioner was unable to show that the Bulgarian government was unwilling or 
unable to protect him from a crime syndicate); Salim v. Holder, 728 F.3d 718, 721 
(7th Cir. 2013) (denying a Chinese Christian asylum-seeker’s petition because he 
was unable to prove that the Indonesian government met the unwilling-or-unable 
standard); Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2011) (granting a 
Jordanian couple’s petitions for review where a familial rumor about the wife’s 
adultery subjected her to a potential honor killing upon return and the Jordanian 
government was unwilling or unable to protect her); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 
611, 616 (7th Cir. 2009) (vacating the BIA’s removal order because the petitioner, 
a Kenyan who had fled the Mungiki tribe, demonstrated the Kenyan 
government’s complicity in tribal violence); Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 428 
(7th Cir. 2009) (granting the petition for review where a born-again El 
Salvadorian Christian could not repatriate because the El Salvadorian 
government was unwilling or unable to protect him from gang violence); 
Ingmantoro v. Mukasey, 550 F. 3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2008) (denying the petition 
for review because the applicant, a Chinese Christian living in Indonesia, failed to 
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8. Eighth Circuit 
The unwilling-or-unable standard is also well-established in 
the Eighth Circuit. 223  In Gathungu v. Holder, a Kenyan asylum 
seeker feared persecution by members of the Mungiki, a violent 
political group that tortured him after he defected.224 Both the IJ and 
BIA found that the applicant had failed to establish that the Kenyan 
government was unwilling or unable to control the Mungiki, citing 
country reports that indicated the Kenyan police had “very strong 
policies” against the Mungiki.225 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held 
that the BIA improperly ignored evidence that the Kenyan 
government accepted bribes and had a practice of “making a show of 
arresting the Mungiki members but then releasing them.” 226  The 
court concluded, “the very fact that the Mungiki have continued to 
create significant violence over the last decade despite repeated 
assertions by the Kenyan government that it is cracking down on the 
Mungiki . . . show the Kenyan government is unable to control the 
Mungiki.”227 This case demonstrates that an asylum seeker can meet 
the unwilling-or-unable standard even if a government “takes action” 
                                                                                                                                     
show that the Indonesian government was unwilling or unable to prevent acts of 
religious or racial violence); Garcia v. Gonzalez, 500 F.3d 615, 618 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(denying the petition for review on the grounds that threats from Colombian 
insurgent group FARC did not satisfy the unwilling-or-unable test); Kaharudin v. 
Gonzalez, 500 F.3d 619, 623 (7th Cir. 2007) (denying judicial review of an 
Indonesian Christian’s asylum claim because “acts of private citizens do not 
constitute persecution unless the government is complicit in those acts or is 
unable or unwilling to take steps to prevent them.”); Tariq v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 
650, 656 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that the applicant’s family’s flight from Pakistan 
to evade a loan shark did not satisfy the unwilling-or-unable test); Margos v. 
Gonzalez, 443 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 2006) (denying review of an Iraqi 
Christian’s asylum claim as the Iraqi government was not unwilling and unable to 
afford protection); Chakir v. Gonzalez, 466 F.3d 563, 570 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(upholding the denial of a Moroccan Christian’s asylum claim on the grounds that 
the private acts of persecution did not satisfy the unwilling-or-unable test).  
223 .  See, e.g., Gathungu v. Holder, 725 F.3d 900, 906 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(granting Kenyan asylum seekers’ petitions for review on the grounds that they 
had fled the Mungiki tribe, that they had been targeted by the tribe as a result of 
being “Mungiki defector[s],” and that the Kenyan government was either 
complicit or unwilling or unable to control the Mungiki); Nabulwala v. Gonzalez, 
481 F.3d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir. 2007) (granting a petition by a Ugandan lesbian 
who faced private violence because of her sexual orientation and who the 
Ugandan government was unwilling or unable to protect). 
224.  Gathungu v. Holder, 725 F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2013). 
225.  Id. at 906. 
226.  Id. at 908–09. 
227.  Id. at 909. 
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to crack down on violence perpetrated by a rebel group if “the record 
shows that many of the crackdown promises are hollow.”228 
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit has acknowledged that harms 
inflicted by nonstate actors could constitute persecution even when 
holding against the applicant. For instance, in Fuentes-Erazo v. 
Sessions, the court recognized the unwilling-or-unable standard.229 
However, the court found that the applicant was not a member of the 
social group “Honduran women in domestic relationships who are 
unable to leave their relationships,” because “she was, in fact, able to 
leave her relationship with [the abuser].”230  The court accordingly 
distinguished Matter of A-R-C-G- based on the protected ground 
requirement of the statute. 231  Similarly, in Rodriguez-Mercado v. 
Lynch, the court recognized the unwilling-or-unable standard and 
held against the applicant in a domestic violence case due to lack of 
credibility, and not because the persecutor was a private individual.232 
Finally, in Guillen-Hernandez v. Holder, the court held against the 
applicant because the extensive police investigation, trial, and 
conviction of the persecutors amply supported the finding that the 
Salvadoran government was both willing and able to control the 
private individuals who had harmed the applicant.233 Unpublished 
decisions from the circuit prior to A-B- I also demonstrate the court’s 
recognition of the unwilling-or-unable standard.234 
Nevertheless, there had been an unexplained and 
unacknowledged tension within the Eighth Circuit’s jurisprudence 
between cases using the unwilling-and-unable standard and cases 
using the condone-or-completely-helpless standard. In Menjivar v. 
Gonzales, the court quoted the Seventh Circuit’s Galina decision in 
stating that “the applicant must show that the government ‘condoned 
                                                            
228.  Id. 
229.  Fuentes-Erazo v. Sessions, 848 F.3d 847, 852 (8th Cir. 2017). 
230.  Id. at 853. 
231.  Id. (citing Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014)). 
232.  Rodriguez-Mercado v. Lynch, 809 F.3d 415, 417, 420 (8th Cir. 2015). 
233.  Guillen-Hernandez v. Holder, 592 F.3d 883, 887 (8th Cir. 2010); see 
also Salman v. Holder, 687 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding against 
applicant because an Israeli court convicted persecutors of murder and sentenced 
them to imprisonment). 
234.  See, e.g., De La Cruz v. Sessions, 697 F. App’x 887, 888 (8th Cir. 2017) 
(upholding the BIA’s determination that the Guatemalan government was neither 
unwilling nor unable to protect the applicant from masked assailants who 
attacked the petitioner and his father-in-law in 2000); Santacruz v. Lynch, 666 F. 
App’x 576, 580 (8th Cir. 2016) (upholding the BIA’s determination that the 
Salvadoran government was neither unwilling nor unable to protect the petitioner 
from domestic violence). 
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it or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the 
victims.’”235 However, the court gave no reasons for departing from 
the well-established unwilling-or-unable test, and, as shown above, 
the Seventh Circuit decision to which it cites did not do so either. 
As set forth in Part V, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
has since clarified that the unwilling-or-unable standard prevails. 
Still, a comparison of the cases in which the court quoted the 
unwilling-or-unable language versus the cases in which the court 
quoted the condone-or-completely-helpless language reveals the perils 
of the latter. Petitioners have succeeded at more than twice the rate 
when the lower unable-or-unwilling standard was cited than when 
the heightened condone-or-completely-helpless standard was 
quoted.236 
9. Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has also consistently 
recognized the unwilling-or-unable standard. 237  In Madrigal v. 
Holder, a former Mexican soldier who had conducted anti-drug 
activities alleged past persecution and a well-founded fear of future 
persecution at the hands of Los Zetas, a violent drug cartel.238 The 
BIA concluded that the Mexican government was willing and able to 
control Los Zetas.239 In its decision, the BIA cited various statistics on 
the efforts of the Mexican national government to combat drug 
violence, including the arrest of seventy-nine thousand people on 
drug trafficking-related charges during a seven-year period.240 The 
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that “the BIA appears 
to have focused only on the Mexican government’s willingness to 
control Los Zetas, not its ability to do so.”241 The court concluded that 
record evidence demonstrated that “violent crime traceable to drug 
cartels remains high despite the Mexican government’s efforts to 
                                                            
235.     Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting 
Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
236.  Compare infra note 395 (noting an 18% grant rate for petitions for 
review using the unable-or-unwilling standard), with infra note 394 (noting only 
an 8% grant rate for petitions for review using the condone-or-completely-helpless 
standard). 
237.  See, e.g., Doe v. Holder, 736 F.3d 871, 873, 77–78 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Doe 
was not required to demonstrate that the Russian government sponsored or 
condoned the persecution of homosexuals . . . .”). 
238.  Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2013). 
239.  Id. at 506. 
240.  Id. at 507. 
241.  Id. at 506. 
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quell it,” suggesting that the Mexican government may lack the 
ability to effectively control Los Zetas. 242  As the court apparently 
recognized, a government that has arrested tens of thousands of drug 
traffickers is not completely helpless at suppressing drug cartels, yet 
might still be unable to protect an asylum seeker. 
In Avetova-Elisseva v. INS, a Russian asylum seeker feared 
future persecution on account of her Armenian ethnicity.243 She was 
born in Baku, Azerbaijan, but fled to escape Azeri ethnic cleansing.244 
With the help of Soviet troops, she crossed the Caspian Sea and 
settled in Moscow.245 While in Russia, though, she continued to face 
harassment. In rejecting her claim, the IJ seemed to apply a 
“condoned” standard, reasoning: 
[T]he inability of the police to sometimes deal with 
[the harassment of people of Armenian descent], is not 
due to the fact that the police is [sic] participating in 
the persecution or harassment but, rather, because of 
lack of resources and a very high crime rate . . . . The 
evidence is not one that shows that the government is 
systematically engaging in these acts or tolerating the 
people that do engage in acts of discrimination and 
harassment, deliberately to persecute Armenians 
because of the fact that they are Armenian.246 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, 
stating: “It does not matter that financial considerations may account 
for such an inability to stop elements of ethnic persecution.” 247 
Further, the court held, “just because the Russian army rescued 
Avetova and other Armenians from a likely death in Azerbaijan does 
not negate the prospect of future persecution that is less than life-
threatening—or even of life-threatening persecution from elements 
that the government cannot control.”248 It is clear that, according to 
the court, a government may be “unable or unwilling” to protect an 
applicant from continued persecution even if it does not “condone” the 
persecution and is not “completely helpless” in aiding the applicant. 
Even when the Ninth Circuit has held against the applicant, 
it has nevertheless acknowledged that harms inflicted by nonstate 
actors can constitute persecution. For instance, in Rahimzadeh v. 
                                                            
242.  Id. at 506–07. 
243.  Avetova-Elisseva v. INS, 213 F.3d 1192, 1195 (9th Cir. 2000). 
244.  Id. at 1196. 
245.  Id. 
246.  Id. at 1197–98. 
247.  Id. at 1198. 
248.  Id. at 1200. 
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Holder, despite finding that the applicant had failed to show that the 
Dutch authorities would be unwilling or unable to protect him from 
extremists, the court stated that persecution may be “committed by 
the government or forces the government is either unable or 
unwilling to control.”249 In Sangha v. INS, the court determined that 
a terrorist group’s actions constituted persecution because the 
government was unable to control the group.250 However, the court 
ultimately held against the applicant because he failed to prove that 
his persecution was motivated by a protected ground.251 
Thus, prior to Matter of A-B- I, the unwilling-or-unable 
standard was well-established in the Ninth Circuit. Unpublished 
cases from that time period establish the same.252 
10. Tenth Circuit 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has also long held that 
persecution “may come from a non-government agency which the 
government is unwilling or unable to control.” 253  In de la Llana-
Castellon v. INS, the BIA denied a Nicaraguan family’s asylum 
application after sua sponte taking administrative notice of the fact 
that elections had brought about a change in government in 
Nicaragua. 254  The Sandinistas, a party that controlled the 
                                                            
249.  Rahimzadeh v. Holder, 613 F.3d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2004); Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 
646, 655–56 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
250.  Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir. 1997). 
251.  Id. at 1491. 
252.  For a sampling of pre-Matter of A-B- I Ninth Circuit cases establishing 
the unable-or-unwilling standard within the circuit, see, e.g., Garces v. Mukasey, 
312 F. App’x 12, 14 (9th Cir. 2009); Ebeid v. Mukasey, 274 F. App’x 508, 511 (9th 
Cir. 2008); Sablina v. Gonzales, 217 F. App’x 671, 672 (9th Cir. 2007); Papazyan v. 
Gonzales, 179 F. App’x 428, 431 (9th Cir. 2006); Mashiri v. Ashcroft, No. 02-
71841, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 22714, at *13 (9th Cir. Sept. 22, 2004); Ganut v. 
Ashcroft, 85 F. App’x 38, 43 (9th Cir. 2003); Velasquez v. Ashcroft, 81 F. App’x 
673, 674 (9th Cir. 2003); . 
253.  de la Llana-Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093, 1097 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(quoting Bartesaghi-Lay v. INS, 9 F.3d 819, 822 (10th Cir. 1993)); see also Krastev 
v. INS, 292 F.3d 1268, 1275–76 (10th Cir. 2002) (stating that persecution may 
come from a non-government entity the government is unable or unwilling to 
control (citing Bartesaghi-Lay, 9 F.3d at 822)); Bartesaghi-Lay, 9 F.3d at 822 
(“[T]he possible persecution to be established by an alien in order for him to be 
eligible for asylum may come from a non-government agency which the 
government is unwilling or unable to control.” (citing McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 
1312, 1315, n.2 (9th Cir. 1981) and Rosa v. INS, 440 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 
1971))). 
254.  de la Llana-Castellon, 16 F.3d at 1095. 
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Nicaraguan government before the elections, had previously 
persecuted the family. The BIA held that the family could no longer 
establish a well-founded fear of future persecution given the change 
in government.255 The court reversed, finding the BIA erred in failing 
to analyze whether the Sandinistas constitute an entity that the 
government was unable or unwilling to control.256 The court reasoned, 
“[t]here may very well be evidence that the coalition government does 
not enjoy full or even marginal control in Nicaragua and that the 
Sandinistas are still a force to be reckoned with.”257 In remanding, the 
court plainly asked the agency to assess whether the family met the 
unwilling-or-unable test, and not the heightened condoned-or-
complete-helplessness test. 
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit upheld the principle that 
harms inflicted by nonstate actors can constitute persecution even 
when it held against the applicant. For instance, in Batalova v. 
Ashcroft, the court acknowledged that harm from private individuals 
could constitute persecution if the government made no attempts to 
control those individuals.258 However, because the court upheld the 
IJ’s adverse credibility finding, it declined to address whether the 
government was unable or unwilling to control the nonstate 
persecutors. 259  The court also has issued several unpublished 
decisions recognizing the unwilling-or-unable standard.260 
11. Eleventh Circuit 
Finally, the unwilling-or-unable standard is similarly well-
established in the Eleventh Circuit. 261  For instance, in Lopez v. 
Attorney General, the court stated that the failure to report nonstate 
persecution to government authorities is “excused where the 
                                                            
255.  Id. 
256.  Id. at 1097. 
257.  Id. 
258.  Batalova v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1246, 1253 (10th Cir. 2004). 
259.  Id. at 1253, 1255. 
260.  For cases applying the unwilling-or-unable standard, see, e.g., Sagala 
v. Mukasey, 295 F. App’x 932, 936 (10th Cir. 2008); Gichema v. Gonzales, 139 F. 
App’x 90, 94 (10th Cir. 2005); Sauveur v. Ashcroft, 108 F. App’x 557, 559 (10th 
Cir. 2004); Nasir v. INS, 30 F. App’x 812, 814 (10th Cir. 2002). 
261.  For cases applying the unwilling-or-unable standard, see, e.g., Sama v. 
U.S. Att’y Gen., 887 F.3d 1225, 1234 (11th Cir. 2018); Malu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 764 
F.3d 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2014); Ayala v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 941, 950 (11th 
Cir. 2010); Lopez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir. 2007); Sanchez 
Jimenez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 1223, 1231 (11th Cir. 2007); Mazariegos v. 
U.S. Att’y Gen., 241 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001). 
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petitioner convincingly demonstrates that those authorities would 
have been unable or unwilling to protect her, and for that reason she 
could not rely on them.”262 The court remanded the decision because 
the BIA and IJ failed to address this point.263 Indeed, the court has 
never in a published decision so much as quoted the condone-or-
completely-helpless language.264 
In Sanchez Jimenez v. Attorney General, the court highlighted 
the unwilling-or-unable standard when it remanded the case in part 
because the IJ did not consider vital evidence on the record when 
applying the standard.265 The court reasoned that the IJ only took 
into account the arrests of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) members when determining the government was able or 
willing to control them, but that the IJ should have also considered 
“the evidence that the arrest spurred the FARC to expressly mark the 
family for death” and when it spurred the FARC to attempt to kidnap 
and murder members of the family.266 
Even when the Eleventh Circuit has ruled against the 
applicant, it has acknowledged the unwilling-or-unable standard. In 
Sama v. Attorney General, the court applied the unwilling-or-unable 
standard in a case involving a Cameroonian asylum seeker who 
suffered significant injuries when an anti-gay group attacked him, 
although the claim was ultimately unsuccessful.267 In Ruiz v. Attorney 
General, the applicant claimed he feared persecution at the hands of 
the FARC in Colombia.268 Despite denying the petition for review 
based on an adverse credibility finding, the court explicitly stated, 
“[t]he statutes governing asylum and withholding of removal protect 
not only against persecution by government forces, but also against 
persecution by non-governmental groups that the government cannot 
control, such as the FARC.” 269  A large number of unpublished 
                                                            
262.  Lopez, 504 F.3d at 1345. 
263.  Id. 
264.  For unpublished decisions where the court has applied the unwilling-
or-unable standard, see, e.g., Cerrato-Chirinos v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 795 F. App’x 
1036, 1040 (11th Cir. 2020); Bautista-Lopez v. U.S. Att’y Gen, 813 F. App’x 430, 
434 (11th Cir. 2020). 
265.  Sanchez Jimenez, 492 F.3d at 1238 n.13. 
266.  Id. 
267.  Sama v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 887 F.3d 1225, 1229, 1234 (11th Cir. 2018). 
268.  Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1251 (11th Cir. 2006). 
269.  Id. at 1257, 1259. 
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decisions from the circuit prior to A-B- I also acknowledge the 
unwilling-or-unable standard.270 
C. The United States Supreme Court 
Likely because of the widespread agreement among the lower 
courts that harms inflicted by nonstate actors can constitute 
persecution so long as the government is unwilling or unable to 
control the nonstate actors, the United States Supreme Court has not 
had occasion to explicitly opine on the issue. However, the Court has 
implicitly acknowledged that harms inflicted by nonstate actors can 
constitute persecution.271 For example, in INS v. Elias-Zacarias, the 
Court evaluated the claim of a Guatemalan asylum applicant who 
                                                            
270.  For a sampling of these cases, see, e.g., Sontay v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 723 
F. App’x 707 (11th Cir. 2018); Acosta v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 727 F. App’x 595 (11th 
Cir. 2018); Sumschi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 677 F. App’x 579 (11th Cir. 2017); Luchina 
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 687 F. App’x 907 (11th Cir. 2017); Acosta v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
704 F. App’x 869 (11th Cir. 2017); Rotaru v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 704 F. App’x 875 
(11th Cir. 2017); Leka v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 704 F. App’x 878 (11th Cir. 2017); Kapa 
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 675 F. App’x 903 (11th Cir. 2017); Jeronimo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
678 F. App’x 796 (11th Cir. 2017); Ossa v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 656 F. App’x 455 (11th 
Cir. 2016); Alonzo-Rivera v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 649 F. App’x 983 (11th Cir. 2016); 
Hossain v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 630 Fed. Appx. 914 (11th Cir. 2015); Zampaligidi-
Jebreel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 539 F. App’x 969 (11th Cir. 2013); Lewis v. U.S. Att’y 
Gen., 512 F. App’x 963 (11th Cir. 2013); Valbuena v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 460 F. App’x 
906 (11th Cir. 2012); Euceda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 491 F. App’x 163 (11th Cir. 2012); 
Minaylova v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 423 F. App’x 855 (11th Cir. 2011); Juan-Esteban v. 
U.S. Att’y Gen., 407 F. App’x 413 (11th Cir. 2011); Wangboje v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
438 F. App’x 813 (11th Cir. 2011); Ladnov v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 384 F. App’x 867 
(11th Cir. 2010); Darmawan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 362 F. App’x 44 (11th Cir. 2010); 
Fernandes de Paula v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 380 F. App’x 946 (11th Cir. 2010); Solaque-
Prieto v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 310 F. App’x 325 (11th Cir. 2009); Zambrano v. U.S. 
Att’y Gen., 329 F. App’x 235 (11th Cir. 2009); Gomez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 321 F. 
App’x 834 (11th Cir. 2009); Cantave v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 295 F. App’x 327 (11th Cir. 
2008); Morehodov v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 270 F. App’x 775 (11th Cir. 2008); Paredes v. 
U.S. Att’y Gen., 219 F. App’x 879 (11th Cir. 2007); Njenga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 216 
F. App’x 963 (11th Cir. 2007); Soler v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 258 F. App’x 295 (11th Cir. 
2007); Barrera Castrillon v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 221 F. App’x 863 (11th Cir. 2007); 
Kurt v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 252 F. App’x 295 (11th Cir. 2007); Longchar v. U.S. Att’y 
Gen., 179 F. App’x 665 (11th Cir. 2006); Restrepo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 176 F. App’x 
17 (11th Cir. 2006); Popov v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 199 F. App’x 900 (11th Cir. 2006); 
Rios-Cano v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 151 F. App’x 916 (11th Cir. 2005); Sulaman v. U.S. 
Att’y Gen., 147 F. App’x 872 (11th Cir. 2005); Calderon Salinas v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
140 F. App’x 868 (11th Cir. 2005). 
271 .  See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 536 n.6 (2009) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (noting that asylum and withholding of removal, unlike relief under 
CAT, are available to victims of persecution at the hands of private actors 
“without regard to state involvement”). 
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claimed that he feared persecution at the hands of a nonstate guerilla 
group.272 The Court found against the applicant on nexus grounds.273 
However, the court never called into question the notion that harms 
perpetrated by a nonstate actor, namely the guerilla group, could 
constitute persecution.274 
Similarly, in his dissent on an unrelated issue in Negusie v. 
Holder, Justice Stevens briefly discussed the difference between 
asylum and withholding of removal—which he stated could be based 
on “harm inflicted by private actors”—and the Convention Against 
Torture, which requires “state involvement.”275 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that the UNHCR 
Handbook “provides significant guidance in construing the Protocol 
[Relating to the Status of Refugees], to which Congress sought to 
conform. It has been widely considered useful in giving content to the 
obligations that the Protocol establishes.” 276  As noted above, the 
Handbook clearly recognizes that harms inflicted by nonstate actors 
can constitute persecution “if the authorities refuse, or prove unable, 
to offer effective protection.”277 
* * * 
The foregoing pre-Matter of A-B- I analysis reveals a high 
degree of agreement among the Board and federal courts of appeals 
that the unable-or-unwilling standard is the proper one for assessing 
nonstate actor claims. The cases also demonstrate the divide between 
the plain meaning of the terms used in each standard. However, they 
also reveal a similar (though perhaps less helpful) consensus to treat 
this standard as emanating from the statutory term “persecution.” As 
discussed in the next two Parts, treating the nonstate actor standard 
as a subcomponent of the persecution analysis—while on the surface 
harmless—may have unwittingly created a space for the agency to 
elevate the standard in Matter of A-B- I and II. 
                                                            
272.  INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 480 (1992). 
273.  Id. at 483–84. 
274.  Id. at 483. 
275.  Negusie, 555 U.S. at 536 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Matter of 
Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996) and Matter of H-, 21 I&N Dec. 337, 
343–44 (B.I.A. 1996)). 
276.  INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (1987). 
277.  U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 2, ¶ 65. 
492 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [52.2 
III. MATTER OF A-B- I AND THE CONDONE-OR-COMPLETELY-
HELPLESS STANDARD 
As set forth above, in 2014, the Board issued a precedential 
decision, Matter of A-R-C-G-, in which it recognized that a victim of 
domestic violence could be eligible for asylum, stating that “married 
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” 
constitute a cognizable social group. 278  The Board remanded the 
decision to the IJ for a determination of whether “the Guatemalan 
Government was unwilling or unable to control the ‘private’ actor.”279 
Nevertheless, in 2018, then-AG Jeff Sessions invoked a 
regulation280  rarely used by previous administrations to certify to 
himself a separate decision, Matter of A-B- I, in which the Board had 
granted asylum to a victim of domestic violence.281  He asked the 
parties and amici to submit briefs on the following question: 
“Whether, and under what circumstances, being a victim of private 
criminal activity constitutes a cognizable ‘particular social group’ for 
purposes of an application for asylum or withholding of removal.”282 
Numerous groups submitted amicus briefs on several 
different aspects of the question posed.283 Regarding the state action 
requirement in particular, 116 immigration law professors 
nationwide submitted a brief demonstrating that it was well-
                                                            
278.  Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388, 392–95 (B.I.A. 2014). 
279.  Id. at 395 (citing Gutierrez-Vidal v. Holder, 709 F.3d 728, 732–33 (8th 
Cir. 2013)); Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 920–22 (8th Cir. 2005) (denying 
review of petition by an asylum seeker from El Salvador who fled after rejecting 
the romantic advances of a gang member, who shot two of the petitioner’s 
relatives, because the IJ properly concluded that the Salvadoran government’s 
response did not rise to the level of “unable or unwilling”). 
280.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2020). 
281.  Matter of A-B- I, 27 I&N Dec. 227, 227 (A.G. 2018). 
282.  Id. It is important to note that the question posed by the Attorney 
General itself was problematic as, generally, individuals had not been arguing 
that “being a victim of a private criminal activity” was what made them members 
of particular social groups. Indeed, the Department of Homeland Security sought 
clarification on this question, which the Attorney General refused to grant. Matter 
of A-B- I, 27 I&N Dec. at 247. Moreover, some amici explicitly disagreed with any 
characterization of intimate partner violence (or the other types of harm described 
in the cases) as “private,” given “that these types of harms often would not occur 
without the societal, even governmental, sanction they enjoy.” Br. for Immigr. L. 
Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2 n.6, Matter of A-B- I, 27 
I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) (No. 3929). 
283.  Backgrounder and Briefing on Matter of A-B-, CTR. FOR GENDER & 
REFUGEE STUD., https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/matter-b/backgrounder-and-briefing-
matter-b [https://perma.cc/4ZBD-8KW8]. 
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established in the BIA, every federal circuit court, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court that those who feared persecution at the hands of 
nonstate actors could qualify for asylum, so long as they showed that 
the home government was unwilling or unable to control the 
persecution.284 
In a sweeping thirty-one-page decision, the Attorney General 
in Matter of A-B- I not only overruled Matter of A-R-C-G- but 
attempted to create a near-blanket prohibition on asylum claims 
made by those fleeing nonstate persecutors, stating that “[g]enerally” 
claims based upon harms “perpetrated by non-governmental actors 
will not qualify for asylum.”285 Significantly, AG Sessions went well 
beyond the scope of the case before him, including not just victims of 
domestic violence, but victims of any type of harm committed at the 
hands of nonstate actors. He stated: “[w]hile . . . violence inflicted by 
non-governmental actors may [sometimes] serve as the basis for [] 
asylum . . . , in practice such claims are unlikely to satisfy the 
statutory grounds for proving group persecution that the government 
is unable or unwilling to address.”286 With respect to the standard for 
nonstate actor claims, he sought to heighten the unwilling-or-unable 
standard, proclaiming that to satisfy the nonstate actor requirement, 
an “applicant must show that the government condoned the private 
actions ‘or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect 
the victims.’”287 
Sessions clearly recognized the dramatic narrowing that 
would result from his altered test.288 Although he continued to use the 
“unable or unwilling” language in the decision, his reasoning makes 
clear that he does not intend for that language to operate as it has 
historically.289 Rather, he sees his redefined nonstate requirement as 
being rarely satisfied; he characterizes those cases in which asylum 
applicants fleeing nonstate persecution could meet the statutory 
requirements as “exceptional.” 290  His assessment is unsurprising 
given his statement that “[w]here the persecutor is not part of the 
                                                            
284.      See generally Br. for Immigr. L. Professors as Amici Curiae, supra 
note 282. 
285.  Matter of A-B- I, 27 I&N Dec. at 320 (emphasis added). 
286.  Id. (emphasis added). 
287.  Id. at 337 (emphasis added) (quoting Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 958 
(7th Cir. 2000)). 
288.  See id. (recognizing that it is exceedingly difficult for victims of private 
violence to prove that they have been persecuted). 
289.  Id. 
290.  Id. at 317. 
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government, the [adjudicator] must consider . . . the government’s 
role in sponsoring or enabling such actions.”291 
In selecting the condone-or-completely-helpless framing of the 
nonstate actor requirement, AG Sessions cherry-picked and seized 
upon the handful of circuit court cases that mentioned this 
language.292 Specifically, he cited the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
Galina and the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Menjivar.293 Beyond citing 
these cases, he offered no rationale or explanation for the change to 
the Board’s longstanding policy that one need only show that the 
government was unwilling or unable to control the persecution. 
Sessions did not provide any explicit justification for using 
this heightened nonstate actor standard. However, as discussed in 
the next Part, both the Justice Department’s defense of Matter of  
A-B- I and the post hoc rationalization provided by Acting AG Rosen 
in Matter of A-B- II assert that the standard is not actually 
heightened, and alternatively, even if it is, the AG is entitled to 
deference in interpreting ambiguous statutory terms. 
IV. LITIGATION RELATED TO THE HEIGHTENED NONSTATE ACTOR 
STANDARD 
Not surprisingly, the A-B- I decision led to a slew of litigation 
in courts around the country. In Grace v. Whitaker, twelve asylum 
applicants who feared either domestic violence or gang violence in 
their home countries filed suit, alleging violations of, inter alia, the 
Administrative Procedure Act and the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (“INA”).294 Specifically, they argued that Matter of A-B- I and 
subsequent United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(“USCIS”) guidelines impermissibly heightened the standards for 
credible fear determinations in nonstate actor cases.295 In a lengthy 
decision, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found 
that Matter of A-B- I and the USCIS guidance incorrectly created “a 
general rule against positive credible fear determinations in cases in 
which aliens claim a fear of persecution based on domestic or gang-
related violence.”296 The court then held that this general rule was 
arbitrary and capricious and runs contrary to the individualized 
                                                            
291.  Id. at 318 (emphasis added). 
292.  Id. at 331, 337. 
293.  Id. at 337. 
294.  Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 105 (D.D.C. 2018). 
295.  Id. 
296.  Id. at 125. 
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determination required by the INA.297 With respect to the nonstate 
actor requirement, in particular, the court held that the condone-or-
completely-helpless formulation was inconsistent with the meaning of 
the term “persecution,” which the court found was unambiguous.298 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, however, 
reversed both aspects of the district court’s decision. In particular, the 
court took a different view of the statutory term “persecution.”299 The 
court explained that the “INA nowhere defines the term 
‘persecution,’” that the term does not address “the standards for 
government conduct,” and that “nothing in the statute otherwise 
speaks directly ‘to the precise question at issue,’” to wit, “the level of 
government culpability required to qualify for asylum.”300 The court 
explicitly rejected the argument that the unwilling-or-unable 
standard “has been a settled construction of the term ‘persecution’ 
since before Congress established the modern asylum system in 
1980.”301 It reasoned that the domestic law the petitioners cited—“a 
single circuit court decision and two Board decisions—is far too 
sparse . . . to conclude that when Congress enacted the Refugee Act, it 
‘would have surveyed the jurisprudential landscape and necessarily 
concluded that the courts had already settled the question.’” 302 
Alternatively, the Grace court stated that, “[i]n any event, the 
decisions the asylum seekers cite are themselves ambiguous 
regarding the non-government persecutor standard.”303 
                                                            
297.  Id. 
298.  Id. at 128. 
299.  Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 897 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
300.  Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842 (1984)). 
301.  Id. 
302.  Id. at 898 (citing Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortgage Corp., 137 S. Ct. 553, 
564 (2017)). Cf. Banister v. Davis, 140 S. Ct. 1698, 1706–07 (2020) (finding that 
one Supreme Court decision and multiple court of appeals decisions established a 
“legal backdrop”); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998) (finding the 
Refugee Act’s meaning “settled” where an Office of Legal Counsel opinion, twelve 
judicial decisions, and multiple federal agencies interpreted the term consistently 
and where “[a]ll indications [we]re that Congress was well aware of th[at] 
position” when it incorporated that term into the statute). 
303.  Grace, 965 F.3d at 898 (citing Rosa v. INS, 440 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 
1971) (lacking discussion of the precise standard for determining when non-
governmental persecutors “[have] sufficient . . . power to carry out [their] 
purposes without effective hindrance”); Matter of Eusaph, 10 I&N Dec. 453, 454–
55 (B.I.A. 1964) (using the terms “unable,” “sponsored,” “tolerated,” and “condone” 
without distinguishing among them); Matter of Stojkovic, 10 I&N Dec. 281, 287 
(B.I.A. 1963) (“not consider[ing]” “whether intentional physical harm . . . by a 
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Nevertheless, the court affirmed the district court on the 
disparate nature of the two nonstate actor requirements.304 The court 
rejected the government’s argument that the unwilling-or-unable 
standard and the condone-or-completely-helpless standard were 
“identical.” It reasoned: “A government that ‘condones’ or is 
‘completely helpless’ in the face of persecution is obviously more 
culpable, or more incompetent, than one that is simply ‘unwilling or 
unable’ to protect its citizens.”305 Moreover, “putting all of its eggs in 
the ‘no change’ basket, the government [did] not, in the alternative, 
defend the condone-or-completely-helpless standard on the merits.”306 
Because the government had not provided a reasoned explanation for 
the change, the court found the imposition of the new heightened 
standard arbitrary and capricious.307 
Several circuit courts have followed the district court’s 
decision in Grace. In Juan Antonio v. Barr, the Sixth Circuit 
approvingly cited Grace’s holding that the condone-or-complete-
helplessness language is “arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, and 
‘not a permissible construction of the persecution requirement.’”308 
The Sixth Circuit, while acknowledging that it was not bound by the 
Grace decision, stated that it found the reasoning in Grace to be 
“persuasive,” and noted that Matter of A-B- I “ha[d] been 
abrogated.”309 
Similarly, the First Circuit implicitly declined to apply the 
more stringent condone-or-completely-helpless standard of Matter of 
A-B- I. In Rosales Justo v. Sessions, the applicant was a police officer 
from Mexico who also owned a store to supplement his income.310 
After he refused to be extorted by members of organized crime, they 
murdered his son.311 Despite reporting the murder to law enforcement 
and attempting to internally relocate, the applicant continued to 
receive threats.312 In reversing the Board’s decision, the First Circuit 
explained that, with respect to claims involving nonstate actors, it 
has “consistently stated that an applicant must prove either 
                                                                                                                                     
riotous mob, acting without the sanction of the Dominican Government, would 
amount to physical persecution”)). 
304.  Id. 
305.  Id. at 898–99. 
306.  Id. at 900. 
307.  Id. 
308.  Juan Antonio v. Barr, 959 F.3d 778, 795 (6th Cir. 2020). 
309.  Id. at 790 n.3. 
310.  Rosales Justo v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 154, 157 (1st Cir. 2018). 
311.  Id. at 157–58. 
312.  Id. at 158. 
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unwillingness or inability” of the government to control the 
persecution.313 Specifically, the court reasoned: “the evidence in the 
record showed only that the police made efforts to investigate [the 
son’s] murder. The evidence showed nothing about the quality of this 
investigation or its likelihood of catching the perpetrators.” 314 
Although the court cited Matter of A-B- I in its decision,315 its analysis 
reveals that it applied the unwilling-or-unable standard and not the 
more stringent condone-or-completely-helpless standard. 
Recently, the Eighth Circuit explicitly clarified that, to the 
extent that the condoned-or-completely-helpless test and the 
unwilling-or-unable test conflict, the unwilling-or-unable test 
controls.316 In Jimenez Galloso v. Barr,317 the IJ had found that the 
applicant—who had suffered significant abuse in the United States at 
the hands of her spouse—was a member of the cognizable particular 
social group of “married Mexican women who are viewed as property 
by virtue of their position within a domestic relationship.”318 While 
the IJ determined that Ms. Jimenez Galloso had failed to timely file 
for asylum, he found that she could “easily me[e]t her [withholding] 
burden,” and thus implicitly found that there was a greater than 50% 
probability of her being harmed in Mexico upon her return. 319 
However, the IJ ultimately denied her withholding claim because he 
found that she could not establish that the Mexican government 
                                                            
313.  Id. at 163 (emphasis in original). 
314.  Id. at 164. 
315.  Id. 
316.  Jimenez Galloso v. Barr, 954 F.3d 1189, 1192 (8th Cir. 2020). 
317.  Id. 
318.     Matter of Prudencia Jimenez Galloso, IJ Decision (Matthew 
Morrissey), Omaha, NE (Jan. 29, 2018) (on file with the Columbia Human Rights 
Law Review). Ms. Jimenez Galloso had also suffered harm in Mexico, but that 
harm largely stemmed from a grandfather who had passed away and her ex-
husband, whom she had divorced. The most significant harms she experienced all 
occurred within the United States. Because the BIA did not provide any analysis 
of past persecution, that issue was not properly before the Court of Appeals. See 
Gathungu v. Holder, 725 F.3d 900, 907 (8th Cir. 2013) (explaining that, where 
“the BIA did not rule on the IJ’s” alternative grounds for denial, those issues are 
“not before [the] court” (citing Ibrahimi v. Holder, 566 F.3d 758, 762 n.3 (8th Cir. 
2009)); Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1037 (8th Cir. 2008) (explaining that 
the Court of Appeals could not consider the nexus issue because the BIA had not 
addressed it). 
319.     INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987) (“[T]o qualify 
for . . . withholding of deportation, [a noncitizen] must demonstrate that ‘it is 
more likely than not that [she] would be subject to persecution’ in the country to 
which [she] would be returned.”) 
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would be “completely helpless” to prevent her persecution.320 The IJ 
also found that because Ms. Jimenez Galloso stated that she would 
not seek protection in Mexico, because she believed it would be futile 
to do so, she could not satisfy the nonstate actor requirement. While 
the case was pending on appeal before the BIA, AG Sessions decided 
Matter of A-B- I.321 The BIA dismissed Ms. Jimenez Galloso’s appeal, 
explaining that Matter of A-B- I’s nonstate actor requirement was the 
same as the Eighth Circuit’s standard, which the IJ found she had 
failed to satisfy.322 
In deciding Jimenez Galloso, the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals resolved a fifteen-year intra-circuit split in favor of the 
unable-or-unwilling standard.323 The court noted that since at least 
1998, it had held that the statutory term “persecution” requires harm 
to be “inflicted either by the government of or by persons or an 
organization that the government was unable or unwilling to 
control.” 324  The court acknowledged that it used the condone-or-
completely-helpless language for the very first time in 2005 in 
Menjivar.325 The court then employed the earlier-in-time rule from a 
previous decision 326  to resolve the intra-circuit conflict Menjivar 
created.327 Because the two lines of cases stood in tension with one 
another, and because the unwilling-or-unable standard came first,328 
the Jimenez Galloso court held that the unable-or-unwilling standard 
must control.329 Ironically, the Eighth Circuit’s earlier decisions were 
among those cited by the Attorney General in Matter of A-B- I in 
purporting to heighten the nonstate actor standard. Unfortunately, 
                                                            
320.     Jimenez Galloso v. Barr, 954 F.3d 1189, 1192 (8th Cir. 2020), as 
amended (Apr. 15, 2020). 
321.  27 I&N Dec. 316 (B.I.A. 2018). 
322 .  Jimenez Galloso, 954 F.3d at 1192; Matter of Prudencia Jimenez 
Galloso (B.I.A. Aug. 13, 2018) (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law 
Review). 
323.  Jimenez Galloso, 954 F.3d at 1192. 
324.  Id. (citing Miranda v. INS, 139 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1998)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
325.  Id. (citing Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2005)). 
326.  See Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (explaining that “when faced with conflicting panel opinions, the earliest 
opinion must be followed as it should have controlled the subsequent panels that 
created the conflict”). 
327.  Jimenez Galloso, 954 F.3d. at 1192 (citing Mader, 654 F.3d at 800). 
328.  Compare Miranda, 139 F.3d at 627 (applying the unable-or-unwilling 
standard) with Menjivar, 416 F.3d at 921 (stating for the first time that a 
petitioner must show the government condones or is completely helpless to 
prevent a nonstate actor’s behavior). 
329.  Jimenez Galloso, 954 F.3d at 1192. 
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the Eighth Circuit’s view in Jimenez Galloso, that the unwilling-or-
unable standard controls, has not been universally shared.330 
Two federal courts of appeals have followed Matter of A-B- I 
and, more specifically, the condone-or-completely-helpless standard. 
In Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, a decision that only briefly addressed the 
condone-or-complete-helplessness language, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals stated that Matter of A-B- I “did not raise the standard for 
the government’s unwillingness or inability to protect to the ‘complete 
helplessness’ standard,” 331  reasoning that the two standards were 
“interchangeable.” 332  Agreeing with Gonzales-Veliz, the Second 
Circuit in Scarlett v. Barr explicitly approved of the condone-or-
completely-helpless language, likewise concluding that it is 
“interchangeable” with the unwilling-or-unable standard. 333  In 
reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit—like the D.C. Circuit in 
Grace—rejected the argument that the term “persecution” 
unambiguously includes the unable-or-unwilling standard. 334  The 
court reasoned that “the word ‘persecution’ is subject to various 
definitions and, thus, sufficiently ambiguous to benefit from Attorney 
General clarification.” 335  The court noted that the statutory term 
“persecution” is ambiguous as to “the severity of [harm]” analysis, 
“but [is] still more ambiguous” in relation to “when private-party 
violence can be attributed to the government . . . because of an 
unwillingness or inability to control it.”336 As such, the court felt duty-
bound to afford Chevron deference to Matter of A-B- I’s construction of 
the term.337 
Nevertheless, the court in Scarlett made clear that “nothing 
in Matter of A-B-’s ‘complete helplessness’ formulation will foreclose” 
                                                            
330.  Though they do not explicitly address the nonstate actor standard, two 
other cases from the federal courts of appeals limit Matter of A-B- I. In De Pena-
Paniagua v. Barr, the First Circuit held that Matter of A-B- I did not categorically 
reject any social group defined in part by its members’ “inability to leave” the 
relationships in which they are being persecuted. 957 F.3d 88, 92 (1st Cir. 2020). 
Similarly, in Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, the Ninth Circuit explicitly held that, “[i]n 
Matter of A-B- I, the Attorney General did not announce a new categorical 
exception for victims of domestic violence or other private criminal activity.” 968 
F.3d 1070, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010). 
331.  Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 233 (5th Cir. 2019). 
332.  Id. 
333.  Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 333 (2d Cir. 2020). 
334.  Id. at 332. 
335.  Id. (citing Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 433 F.3d 332, 340−41 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (collecting cases defining “persecution” in different ways)). 
336.  Id. 
337.  Id. 
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asylum where a government offered “only ineffective assistance.”338 
The court thus approved of the condone-or-completely-helpless 
formulation, but only on the understanding that it does not heighten 
the longstanding unwilling-or-unable standard. Moreover, although 
the court cited to Eighth Circuit case law multiple times for the 
proposition that the condone-or-completely-helpless language is not 
new, it failed to mention the Eighth Circuit’s recent decision in 
Jimenez Galloso, in which the court explicitly clarified that the 
unwilling-or-unable standard controls.339 
In response to the foregoing litigation, Acting AG Jeffrey 
Rosen issued Matter of A-B- II on January 14, 2021. In it, he provided 
the Trump administration’s final defense of the heightened condone-
or-complete-helplessness articulation of the nonstate actor element.340 
Seeking to make use of the agency’s victories in the Second and Fifth 
Circuits in Scarlett and Gonzales-Veliz respectively, the Acting AG in 
Matter of A-B- II claimed that the condone-or-complete-helplessness 
articulation was not a departure from the older unable-or-unwilling 
test. Rosen explained that Matter of A-B- I “relied on several [f]ederal 
court decisions” to hold that the unable-or-unwilling standard 
required “an applicant to show that the government condoned the 
[persecution] ‘or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to 
protect the victims.” 341  While acknowledging the charge that this 
condone-or-completely-helpless standard was “inconsistent with” the 
unable-or-unwilling standard, he asserted “the two are 
interchangeable” because the courts of appeals began using them as 
such years before Matter of A-B- I. 342  He then countered the 
conclusion of the D.C. Circuit in Grace—that the two standards are 
different—by arguing that Grace failed to “discuss the several circuit 
court decisions” that had used Matter of A-B- I’s nonstate actor test 
before Sessions adopted it.343 In short, the Acting AG in Matter of 
                                                            
338.  Id. at 334. 
339.  Id. at 331–33 (citing Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 
2005); Saldana v. Lynch, 820 F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir. 2016)). 
340.      Matter of A-B- II, 28 I&N Dec. 199. 
341.      Id. at 200–01 (citing Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2000). 
342.      Id. at 201 (citing Guillen-Hernandez v. Holder, 592 F.3d 883, 886–87 
(8th Cir. 2010) (quoting, with approval, “condoned it or at least demonstrated a 
complete helplessness to protect the victims” language from Galina, 213 F.3d at 
958); Kere v. Gonzales, 252 F. App'x 708, 712 (6th Cir. 2007) (same); Shehu v. 
Gonzales, 443 F.3d 435, 437 (5th Cir. 2006) (same); Hor v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 497, 
501–02 (7th Cir. 2005) (same)). 
343.      Id. at 201 (citing Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 889–900 (D.C. Cir. 
2020)). 
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A-B- II claimed, anachronistically, that its framing of the unwilling-
or-unable standard is what courts meant all along.344  
However, in apparently discerning that not everyone would be 
convinced by his dubious claim of synonymy between the two tests, he 
spent most of his time in Matter of A-B- II arguing that even if  
Matter of A-B- I’s articulation were an altered standard, it constituted 
a reasonable construction of the ambiguous statutory term 
“persecution.”345 But in his elaboration of this new nonstate actor 
standard, Rosen confirmed that the condone-or-complete-helplessness 
test—as those words suggest—is vastly more difficult to satisfy.346 He 
began by stating that in order for violence to constitute persecution, it 
must be tethered to a governmental system, 347  writing that 
persecution “always implies some connection to government action or 
inaction.” 348  Thus, it is only where “the government in the home 
country has fallen so far short of adequate protection” as to “have 
some role in or responsibility for the ‘persecution’” that the test can be 
met.349 He concluded this step of his analysis by stating “[a]sylum law 
protects persons from severe harm inflicted by their government,”350 
approaching the suggestion that nonstate persecutor claims are no 
longer viable. Indeed, Sessions and Rosen may have intended this 
effect by adopting the condone-or-complete-helplessness test, as it 
appears virtually impossible to satisfy.  
Even the most minimal and ineffective state efforts to protect, 
according to Rosen, are sufficient to defeat an asylum claim subjected 
to the condone-or-complete-helplessness test. He stated that the 
condone-or-complete-helplessness test requires “more than the failure 
to prevent or solve a crime.” 351  The test is not met “where a 
government has taken efforts to punish wrongdoers” or “to detect 
and . . . prevent” the harm. 352  It is not met where a government 
simply gives “light sentences” for perpetrators of the harm.353 It is not 
                                                            
344.      Id. at 202. 
345.      Id. 
346.      Id. at 204 (the “level of [state] inaction or ineffectiveness 
required . . . [is] high”). 
347.      Id. at 203 (citing Rodas-Mendoza v. INS, 246 F.3d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir. 
2001)). 
348.      Id. at 204 (citing Harutyunyan v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 64, 68 (1st Cir. 
2005)). 
349.      Id. at 204–05. 
350.      Id. at 205 (emphasis added). 
351.      Id. at 205. 
352.      Id. 
353.      Id. at 206. 
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met where a government is “not always successful” at “enforce[ing] its 
laws” intended to protect. 354  It is not met where “police . . . prove 
ineffective, and the guilty . . . go unpunished.”355 It is not even met 
where there is “localized police apathy or incompetence” unless an 
applicant can also show the entire government—countrywide—
condones the violence or is completely helpless to stop it.356 In fact, 
Rosen stated that one should not even focus “on whether government 
efforts to protect the applicant were effective,” as apparently any 
state effort to protect demonstrates that a government is not 
“completely helpless.”357 Then, linking the effectiveness analysis back 
to his initial point about state culpability, he suggested that, in order 
to meet the test, the state must be inept to such a degree that the 
“‘persecution’ by third parties may be attributed to the 
government.”358 
Lastly, Rosen sought to secure this new test—with its post 
hoc rationalization—through explicit appeal to the agency’s Chevron 
and Brand X authority.359 To combat “existing case law in [] circuits” 
that conflict with Matter of A-B- I, he characterized Matter of A-B- II 
as a “clear and controlling interpretation[] of the statutory ‘unable or 
unwilling,’ [and] ‘persecution’ . . . requirements.”360 He explains that 
the “Attorney General ‘has primary responsibility for construing 
ambiguous provisions’” such as the term “persecution”, and thus “his 
‘reasonable construction’ . . . is entitled to deference.”361 Therefore, he 
concluded, his version of the nonstate actor requirement must trump 
contrary constructions adopted in the circuits that rejected Matter of 
A-B- I.362  
* * * 
Despite broad agreement prior to Matter of A-B- I that the 
correct standard to apply in nonstate actor cases was the unable-or-
                                                            
354.      Id. 
355.      Id. 
356.      Id. at 207. 
357.      Id. at 205. 
358.      Id. at 213. 
359.      Id. 
360.      Id. (emphasis added). 
361.      Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 844 (1984)). 
362.      Id. (citing Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 
545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (“A court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps 
an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior 
court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of 
the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”)). 
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unwilling standard, there is now substantial disagreement among the 
courts as to which standard to apply, as well as the nature of that 
standard. Further, now that Matter of A-B- II has brought into focus 
the amount of damage that can be inflicted on current asylum 
structures through a heightened nonstate actor requirement, it is 
vital that this element be correctly construed. This Article contends 
that the conditions that have permitted the test to be heightened 
stem from the failure of the agency and courts to properly conform 
the nonstate actor requirement to the Refugee Act. The unwilling-or-
unable standard is the correct one because it is most consonant with a 
fulsome understanding of the statutory refugee definition, which 
includes those who are “unable or unwilling to avail” themselves of 
state protection because of “a well-founded fear of persecution.” The 
next Part argues that the only acceptable construction of the unable-
or-unwilling standard is one that uses the probability of harm 
analysis as the guiding principle for measuring the effectiveness of 
state protection. This framing of the standard is the most faithful to 
the Refugee Convention and Refugee Act. Rather than grounding the 
unable-or-unwilling test in the term “persecution,” we seek to 
advance a new framework for approaching the nonstate actor 
requirement. 
V. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR IDENTIFYING THE CORRECT NONSTATE 
ACTOR STANDARD 
The litigation position of the U.S. government in defending 
Matter of A-B- I’s condone-or-completely-helpless standard had been 
to argue that it did not meaningfully alter the familiar unable-or-
unwilling standard, but simply provided an acceptable interpretation 
of the traditional rule that is owed Chevron deference. 363  The 
government argued that because the standard is unchanged, it 
cannot possibly be causing harm or impacting outcomes. 364  The 
government apparently believed that it could have all the benefits of 
a heightened standard if the condone-or-completely-helpless language 
remained in the case law, even if it was not officially acknowledged as 
heightened. 
In seeking to cabin the damage AG Sessions intended, some 
refugee advocates had likewise argued that, while the AG might have 
                                                            
363.      See Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“The 
government insists that no change occurred, that is, that the two standards are 
identical.”). 
364.  Id. 
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desired to raise the nonstate actor standard, he did not clearly do 
so.365 This argument derived from the need to continue to litigate 
nonstate persecution cases before AOs and IJs—who are bound by the 
AG’s decision366—and a desire to defuse the government’s call for 
Chevron deference.367 For if the AG did not clearly announce a new 
standard, much less provide a rationale for the departure, it should 
not be accorded Chevron deference.368 
In this respect, there was a surprising degree of overlap 
between the positions of the Justice Department and some refugee 
advocates in their treatment of the nature of Matter of A-B- I’s 
pronouncements on the nonstate actor. Additionally, there was some 
convergence between the parties’ respective positions insofar as the 
parties set the terms of the debate, in part, as a dispute over the 
proper understanding of the statutory term “persecution.” Where 
opponents of Matter of A-B- I argued that the term “persecution” 
unambiguously includes the unable-or-unwilling test, the government 
argued that the term “persecution” is ambiguous and benefits from 
Matter of A-B- I’s clarification, which is owed deference under 
Chevron.369 
Informed by the decisions issued after Matter of A-B- I, as 
well as the recent issuance of Matter of A-B- II, we believe that a 
paradigm shift is needed. First, it is imperative to clearly call out and 
challenge the condone-or-completely-helpless formulation as a more 
                                                            
365.  See, e.g., Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 233 (5th Cir. 2019) (“As 
Gonzales-Veliz acknowledges, in this circuit as well as others, the ‘inability or 
unwillingness’ standard is interchangeable with the ‘complete helplessness’ 
standard.”); see also Bishop, supra note 29, at 529 (“In fact, despite including 
rhetoric suggesting a heightened standard, Matter of A-B- actually only applied 
the ‘unable or unwilling’ to control standard, thereby muddying how harms by 
nongovernment actors should be evaluated.”). 
366.  8 CFR §§ 103.10(b), 1003.1(g) (2020). 
367.  See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2127 
(2016) (rejecting the government’s claim of Chevron deference due to a lack of 
reasoned basis for a new regulation). 
368.  See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) 
(asserting that the agency may not depart from prior policy sub silentio and must 
demonstrate good reasons for the new policy); Sw. Airlines v. FERC, 926 F.3d 851, 
856 (2019) (finding FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously because it did not 
announce or provide justification for fundamental departure from agency policy); 
Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852–53 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
(finding the FCC’s decision was sound and not arbitrary because it had provided a 
rationale for its departures from the decision of the Hearing Examiner). 
369.  The government made such arguments both in Scarlett v. Barr, 957 
F.3d 316, 332 (2d Cir. 2020) and Jimenez Galloso v. Barr, 954 F.3d 1189, 1192 
(8th Cir. 2020). 
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onerous standard. While it was understandable to take the position 
that Matter of A-B- I did not actually heighten the standard when 
litigating before IJs and the BIA,370 advocates must forcefully assert 
and preserve arguments that Matter of A-B- I and II have in fact 
elevated the nonstate actor standard in a way that is contrary to the 
statute and congressional intent. 371  The risk in conceding that  
Matter of A-B- I and II did not elevate the standard is that asylum 
seekers may be stuck with all of the negative consequences of the 
condone-or-completely-helpless standard (i.e., that the plain language 
of this standard is objectively more difficult to satisfy) without any 
ability to argue that the heightened standard is an erroneous and 
unreasoned departure from the existing standard.372 A position that 
equates the two standards not only requires adjudicators to ignore 
the plain language they employ, it fails to appreciate the fact that a 
significant number of cases demonstrate that the condone-or-
completely-helpless standard is highly correlated to an increase in 
case denials.373 
Second, it is time to rethink the best legal strategy for 
combatting any heightened nonstate actor standard. While efforts to 
ground the traditional unwilling-or-unable standard in the term 
“persecution” have produced mixed results, 374  the argument is 
vulnerable due to well-established administrative law principles of 
deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms375 
                                                            
370.  See 8 CFR §§ 103.10(b), 1003.1(g) (2020). 
371.  See, e.g., Kanagu v. Holder, 781 F.3d 912, 917 (8th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e 
lack jurisdiction to consider arguments not clearly made before the agency.”) 
372.  See, e.g., Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (holding 
that USCIS’s departure from established practices was unreasoned and 
arbitrary). 
373.  See supra Part II. 
374.  Compare Grace, 965 F.3d at 897–98 (rejecting asylum seeker’s attempt 
to argue that term “persecution” unambiguously includes the unwilling-or-unable 
test) and Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 233 (5th Cir. 2019) (explaining 
that “[a]gencies are free to change their existing policies as long as they provide a 
reasoned explanation for the change”), and Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 333 (2d 
Cir. 2020) (holding that the term “‘persecution’ is . . . sufficiently ambiguous to 
benefit from Attorney General clarification.”), with Jimenez Galloso v. Barr, 954 
F.3d 1189, 1192 (8th Cir. 2020) (rejecting wholesale adoption of the condone-or-
completely-helpless standard due to the earlier definition of term “persecution”), 
and Juan Antonio v. Barr, 959 F.3d 778, 975 (6th Cir. 2020) (rejecting the 
condone-or-completely-helpless standard as an impermissible construction of the 
persecution requirement). 
375.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
43 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for [we], 
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and the widespread recognition that the term “persecution” is 
ambiguous.376 This vulnerability was laid bare by Matter of A-B- II.377 
As such, advocates must advance arguments that clearly link the 
traditional standard to the more explicit language employed by the 
Refugee Act and Refugee Convention that speak of refugees as those 
who are “unable or unwilling to avail [themselves] . . . of [state] 
protection . . . because of . . . a well-founded fear of persecution.” 378 
Despite the obvious parallels between the “unable or unwilling to 
avail” of state protection language and the “unable or unwilling to 
protect” standard, courts have completely ignored this statutory basis 
for the nonstate actor requirement.379 This Article argues that there 
can be no room for a condone-or-completely-helpless test when, as the 
statute requires, the state protection analysis is viewed through the 
lens of the probability of harm. 
Next, Section C considers whether there is any further utility 
at all to the statutory arguments that ground the unable-or-unwilling 
standard in the term “persecution.” While there is significant support 
in the case law for this framing, we explore the weaknesses of this 
                                                                                                                                     
as well as the [AG], must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.”). 
376.  See, e.g., Mballa Bouba v. Sessions, 744 F. App’x 116, 126 (4th Cir. 
2018) (“There is no set definition of persecution; the term is undefined by both 
Congress and the BIA.”); Rios-Zamora v. Sessions, 751 F. App’x 784, 786 (6th Cir. 
2018) (“Persecution is an “ambiguous” term that is not defined in the INA or the 
accompanying regulations.”); Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1357 
(11th Cir. 2009) (“There is no universally accepted definition of persecution. The 
INA is silent on the term’s definition.”); Amouri v. Holder, 572 F.3d 29, 33 (1st 
Cir. 2009) (“Persecution is a protean term, undefined by statute.”); Shi Liang Lin 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 494 F.3d 296, 329 (2d Cir. 2007) (“As with any ambiguous 
statutory term, it is for the BIA to determine within its expertise what exactly 
constitutes ‘persecution’ so long as its interpretation is reasonable.”); Chen v. 
Gonzales, 457 F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 2006) (“There is no statutory definition of 
persecution, and the BIA has not yet developed any definition of its own . . . .”); 
Cai Luan Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 232 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[W]ith the exception 
of forced abortions and sterilizations, the concept of “persecution” is left 
completely undefined. We infer from Congress’s use of this ambiguous term an 
intent to delegate interpretive authority to the agency, including the ability to 
decide, within a reasonable range, the precise contours of its meaning.”); Corado 
v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 945, 947 (8th Cir. 2004) (“The BIA is entitled to deference in 
interpreting ambiguous statutory terms such as ‘persecution,’ so long as its 
interpretation is reasonable and consistent with the statute.”); Fisher v. INS, 79 
F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The [INA] does not define “persecution”; therefore, 
we must defer to the Board’s interpretation . . . .”). 
377.      Matter of A-B- II, 28 I&N Dec. at 213. 
378.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); Refugee Convention, supra note 42, art 1. 
379.  See supra Part I. 
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approach and propose a few possible solutions and areas for further 
research. 
Finally, this Part concludes by offering additional areas for 
exploration by discussing strategies that show promise in the effort to 
challenge the condone-or-complete-helplessness standard in courts of 
appeals that have not yet deferred to the heightened nonstate actor 
articulation. 
A. Showing That Matter of A-B- I and II Heightened the Standard 
While some circuit decisions have deferred to Matter of  
A-B- I’s condone-or-completely-helpless test, claiming it is not 
meaningfully different from the unwilling or unable test, 380  this 
assertion is belied both by the plain language used in the two tests as 
well as a careful analysis of the disparate outcomes in cases 
employing the two different standards. 
There is a clear distinction in the ordinary meanings of the 
words “condone” and “unwilling” on the one hand, and “completely 
helpless” and “unable” on the other. It is axiomatic that “unwilling” 
does not mean “condone.” There may be many reasons why a 
government would be unwilling to protect an applicant from 
persecution short of condoning the persecution, including that the 
government may have other enforcement priorities or simply believe 
that the persecution is a family matter best handled in the home. 
Similarly, “unable” does not mean “completely helpless.” The words 
“complete” or “completely” are modifiers that signify “in every 
way . . ., as much as possible” or “to a full extent or degree” with 
synonyms such as “thoroughly . . ., totally, utterly . . ., [and] wholly.”381 
And the words “helpless” or “helplessness” mean: “defenseless, or 
marked by an inability to act or react;” “the . . . state of being unable 
to do anything to help yourself or anyone else;” “weak, 
dependent; . . . powerless; incapacitated.”382 The only countries in the 
world that can be so described are failed states. 
                                                            
380.  Gonzales-Veliz, 938 F.3d at 233; Scarlett, 957 F.3d at 333. 
381.     See Completely, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge. 
org/us/dictionary/english/completely [https://perma.cc/B7JQ-NFJP]; Helpless, 
MERIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
helpless [https://perma.cc/LRU4-HGAV] (emphasis added). 
382.    Helplessness, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge. 
org/us/dictionary/english/helplessness [https://perma.cc/T72B-DY75] (emphasis 
added); see also Salman v. Holder, 687 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 2012) (equating 
“helpless” with “powerless”). 
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As noted above, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia specifically rejected the government’s argument that the 
unwilling-or-unable standard and the condoned-or-complete-
helplessness standard were “identical,” reasoning that “[a] 
government that ‘condones’ or is ‘completely helpless’ in the face of 
persecution is obviously more culpable, or more incompetent, than 
one that is simply ‘unwilling or unable’ to protect its citizens.”383 
There can be no serious argument that the ordinary meanings 
of those words are synonymous. A contrary position requires 
adjudicators to pretend that the condone-or-completely-helpless 
framing simply does not mean what those words ordinarily mean, a 
position that will invariably lead to confusion and erroneous 
outcomes. The “linguistic difference between the words” requires a 
conclusion that the standards are not the same.384 Even if courts 
declare by fiat—as did the Acting AG in Matter of A-B- II—that the 
two standards are the same, adjudicators below who are under strict 
processing quotas385will very likely treat the apparently heightened 
condone-or-completely-helpless language as a more onerous 
standard.386  If the two standards are in fact the same, then only 
confusion will result in using a standard that at least in name is more 
exacting. 
Moreover, nothing in the decisions of those courts that have 
held the two standards to be synonymous provides any real 
explanation for why we should pretend that the words “condone” and 
                                                            
383.  Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 898–99 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
384 .  See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 433–34 (1987) 
(holding that the words “well-founded fear” and “clear probability” justify 
applying two different standards (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
385.  See George Tzamaras & Belle Woods, The Need for an Independent 
Immigration Court Grows More Urgent As DOJ Imposes Quotas on Immigration 
Judges, AM. IMMIGR. L. ASS’N (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.aila.org/advo-
media/press-releases/2018/need-independent-court-doj-judges 
[https://perma.cc/JBQ7-668Q] (stating that IJs are required “to finish 700 cases 
per year or face disciplinary action”). 
386.  In Nabulwala v. Gonzalez, for example, the IJ had read Menjivar’s use 
of the condone-or-complete-helplessness formulation to effectively eliminate 
asylum for refugees fleeing nonstate actor persecutors, denying relief because the 
asylum seeker’s “past persecution was ‘not in any way government-sponsored or 
authorized.’” 481 F.3d 1115, 1117–18 (8th Cir. 2007). AG Sessions expressed a 
similar sentiment in Matter of A-B- I, writing that “[w]here the persecutor is not 
part of the government, the [adjudicator] must consider . . . the government’s role 
in sponsoring or enabling such actions.” 27 I&N Dec. 316, 318 (A.G. 2018). 
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“completely helpless” do not carry their ordinary meaning.387 Apart 
from claiming the two formulations “serve the same purpose,” the 
cases make no attempt to reconcile the obviously divergent meanings 
of the terms used.388  
Similarly, while the Acting AG in Matter of A-B- II 
halfheartedly suggested the “ordinary sense of” those words were the 
same and that the condone-or-completely-helpless standard was “not 
a more stringent test,” that assertion is clearly undermined by the 
AG’s elaboration of the test.389 The Acting AG in Matter of A-B- II 
provided that the threshold for that test’s satisfaction was high and 
rarely met, 390  a clear departure from the traditional unable-or-
unwilling standard.391 Additionally, his analysis of the plain language 
consisted merely of pointing out that a government that condones 
persecution can be described as “unwilling” to prevent it, and a 
government that is completely helpless is “unable” to protect. 392 
However, his argument misses the point. Clearly a lower threshold 
will always be included within a higher one, but this does not render 
them equivalent.393 Every government that is completely helpless is 
unable to protect, but the reverse is not true.  
Yet it is not just a linguistic analysis that leads to the 
conclusion that the standards differ; analysis of case resolutions 
points to the same conclusion. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals—
a court that has used and applied this standard in more cases than 
any other—reveals just how elevated the condone-or-complete-
helplessness threshold is. On petitions for review where the Eighth 
Circuit cited the condone-or-complete-helplessness standard394 rather 
                                                            
387.  Cf. Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 333 (2d Cir. 2020) (declaring the 
two standards to be “interchangeable” without any actual analysis of the words 
used); Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 233 (5th Cir. 2019) (same). 
388.  Scarlett, 957 F.3d at 333; see also Gonzales-Veliz, 938 F.3d at 233 
(stating that the “two formulations accomplish the same purpose.”). 
389.      Matter of A-B- II, 28 I&N Dec. at 201–02. 
390.      Id. at 203–07. 
391.  See supra Part II. 
392.  Id. at 202. 
393.  For example, any asylum applicant that fails to satisfy the lower well-
founded fear probability of harm threshold necessarily fails to satisfy the higher 
clear probability threshold for claims for withholding of removal. However, that 
does not make the two standards the same. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 
421, 423 (1987). 
394.  For cases denying applicants’ petitions for review, citing the condone-
or-complete-helplessness standard, see Fuentes-Erazo v. Sessions, 848 F.3d 847, 
854 (8th Cir. 2017) (denying petition for review (“PFR”)); Saldana v. Lynch, 820 
F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir. 2016) (denying PFR); Ming Li Hui v. Holder, 769 F.3d 984, 
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than the unwilling-or-unable standard,395 virtually all were denied. In 
nearly fifteen years of cases decided on this issue, just one case before 
the Eighth Circuit, Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 396  cited the elevated 
standard and found the nonstate actor requirement satisfied.397 And a 
searching analysis of Ngengwe reveals that the court did not actually 
apply a true condone-or-complete-helplessness standard; it just cited 
it in the course of applying the familiar unable-or-unwilling 
standard. 398  However, even if Ngengwe is numbered among the 
condone-or-complete-helplessness line of cases in the Eighth Circuit, 
petitioners still succeeded at more than twice the rate when the lower 
unable-or-unwilling standard was cited.399 
                                                                                                                                     
986–87 (8th Cir. 2014) (denying PFR); Constanza-Martinez v. Holder, 739 F.3d 
1100, 1103 (8th Cir. 2014) (denying PFR); De Castro-Gutierrez v. Holder, 713 F.3d 
375, 381 (8th Cir. 2013) (denying PFR); Gutierrez-Vidal v. Holder, 709 F.3d 728, 
732 (8th Cir. 2013) (denying PFR); Salman v. Holder, 687 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 
2012) (denying PFR); Guillen-Hernandez v. Holder, 592 F.3d 883, 887 (8th Cir. 
2010) (denying PFR); Khilan v. Holder, 557 F.3d 583, 585 (8th Cir. 2009) (denying 
PFR); Setiadi v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 710, 714 (8th Cir. 2006) (denying PFR); 
Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2005) (denying PFR). But see 
Ngengwe, v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1035 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding nonstate actor 
requirement satisfied). 
395.  For cases applying some version of the unwilling-or-unable standard, 
see Juarez-Coronado v. Barr, 919 F.3d 1085, 1089 (8th Cir. 2019) (denying PFR); 
Edionseri v. Sessions, 860 F.3d 1101, 1105 (8th Cir. 2017) (denying PFR), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 1332 (2018), reh’g denied, 138 S. Ct. 2019 (2018); Cinto-
Velasquez v. Lynch, 817 F.3d 602, 606 (8th Cir. 2016); Gathungu v. Holder, 725 
F.3d 900, 906 (8th Cir. 2013) (granting PFR); La v. Holder, 701 F.3d 566, 571 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (denying PFR); Shaghil v. Holder, 638 F.3d 828, 834 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(denying PFR); Osuji v. Holder, 657 F.3d 719, 721–22 (8th Cir. 2011) (denying 
PFR); Bracic v. Holder, 603 F.3d 1027, 1034 (8th Cir. 2010) (granting PFR); 
Khrystotodorov v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 775, 783 (8th Cir. 2008) (denying PFR); 
Beck v. Mukasey, 527 F.3d 737, 740 (8th Cir. 2008) (denying PFR); Nabulwala v. 
Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir. 2007) (granting PFR); Makatengkeng v. 
Gonzales, 495 F.3d 876, 885 (8th Cir. 2007) (denying PFR); Lengkong v. Gonzales, 
478 F.3d 859, 862 (8th Cir. 2007) (denying PFR); Suprun v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 
1078, 1080–81 (8th Cir. 2006) (denying PFR); Kimumwe v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 
319, 322–23 (8th Cir. 2005) (denying PFR); Alyas v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 756, 761 
(8th Cir. 2005) (denying PFR).  
396.  Ngengwe, v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1035 (8th Cir. 2008). 
397.  Id. at 1035–36. 
398.  Id. at 1036 (stating that “[g]iven the evidence in the record that the 
Cameroonian government would not protect Ngengwe from her in-laws, this court 
finds no substantial evidence to uphold the IJ’s and BIA’s decision” and citing to 
cases that quote the unwilling-or-unable standard). 
399.  Compare supra note 395 (reflecting an 18% grant rate for petitions for 
review using the unable-or-unwilling standard), with supra note 394 (reflecting a 
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Whether viewed through the lens of the ordinary meaning of 
the words used in the condone-or-complete-helplessness standard or 
the results of cases employing that test, the conclusion is the same: 
the nonstate actor standard of Matter of A-B- I and II is a heightened 
one. Failing to demonstrate utter and complete powerlessness on the 
part of the state to provide protection will prove fatal in virtually all 
claims subjected to that articulation of the nonstate actor test. 
B. Unwilling or Unable to Avail of State Protection: The Plain 
Language of the Refugee Act 
Having shown that Matter of A-B- I and II heightened the 
nonstate actor test, we contend that the strategy most likely to 
succeed against that test is one that anchors the unable-or-unwilling 
standard in the plain language used in the Refugee Act. The 
statutory refugee definition—which includes those “who [are] unable 
or unwilling to . . . avail [themselves] of the protection” of their 
country “because of . . . a well-founded fear of persecution”—must 
serve as the foundation for any permissible nonstate actor doctrine.400 
As noted above, the Supreme Court has explained that “the 
[Refugee Act’s] legislative history . . . demonstrates that Congress 
added the ‘well-founded’ language only because that was the 
language incorporated by the United Nations Protocol to which 
Congress sought to conform.”401 The Court stated that “the legislative 
history of the new definition of ‘refugee,’ and indeed the entire 1980 
Act,” clearly reveals that “Congress’ primary purpose was to bring 
United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United 
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees . . . to which the 
United States acceded in 1968.”402 The Court explicitly found that the 
“definition of ‘refugee’ that Congress adopted . . . is virtually identical 
to the one prescribed by . . . the Convention,” demonstrating 
“congress[ional] intent” to interpret “the new statutory definition of 
‘refugee’ . . . in conformance with the” Refugee Convention’s and 
Protocol’s definition.”403 
The Refugee Convention, in turn, defines refugees, in relevant 
part, as those who “owing to [a] well-founded fear of being 
persecuted . . . [are] unable or, owing to such fear . . . , unwilling to 
                                                                                                                                     
grant rate of just 8% for petitions for review using the condone-or-completely-
helpless standard). 
400.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). 
401.  INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 434–35 (1987). 
402.  Id. at 436–37. 
403.  Id. at 437. 
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avail [themselves] of the protection of [their] country.” 404  To 
understand the Refugee Convention drafters’ intent in employing the 
language “unable or . . . unwilling to avail . . . of [state] protection,” it 
is necessary to look to the documents from which that language is 
derived. 405  The Refugee Convention did not create the phrase; 
instead, it appears in earlier documents related to the creation of 
refugee protection. For example, the IRO Constitution, discussed 
above, 406  provided protection for “displaced persons” who were 
“expelled from their own countries” for reasons of “race, religion, 
nationality, or political opinion,” as well as “those unable or unwilling 
to avail themselves of the protection of the government of their 
country.” 407  The UNHCR’s Statute contained similar language, 
“extend[ing] [protection] to [a]ny other person who is outside the 
country of his nationality . . . [who] is unable or, because of such fear, 
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the government of the 
country of his nationality.”408 
At the time these international law documents were drafted, 
state protection was understood to include both (1) external 
protection, such as “consular services,” “the provision of passports,” 
and similar services;409  as well as (2) internal protection, such as 
obligations to safeguard “the refugee’s basic human rights, including 
the right to life, liberty, and security of the person.”410 Thus, it was 
not just a country’s failure to protect a refugee from harms within the 
country that was relevant for the analysis; ineffectiveness of consular 
and diplomatic protection outside the country was also weighed. This 
expansive understanding of “state protection” for the drafters of the 
Refugee Convention must inform how we approach the Refugee 
                                                            
404.  Refugee Convention, supra note 42, art. 1. 
405.  See, e.g., Matter of Negusie, 27 I&N Dec. 347, 353–60 (B.I.A. 2018) 
(examining the legislative history of the Refugee Act and noting the strong 
similarities between the Act and the Refugee Convention); accord GOODWIN-GILL 
& MCADAM, supra note 51, at 7–8 (“[A] treaty ‘shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’” (quoting Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331)). The intent of the Refugee Convention should serve as the 
lens through which questions of the meaning of “state protection” are viewed. 
406.  See supra note 53 and accompanying text; Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 
at 437–38 (citing IRO CONST., annex 1, pt. 1, § C1(a)(i)). 
407.  GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 51, at 19 (emphasis added). 
408.  Id. at 21. 
409.  Id. at 22 (citing A Study of Statelessness, supra note 57). 
410.  Id. at 23. 
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Convention’s and Refugee Act’s use of the language “unable 
or . . . unwilling to avail . . . of [state] protection.” 
Similarly, it was not just the availability of protection that 
mattered, but the putative refugee’s willingness to lay claim to that 
protection. A 1949 U.N. report on statelessness describes refugees as 
“persons who, having left the country of which they were nationals, 
no longer enjoy the protection and assistance of their national 
authorities, either because these authorities refuse to grant them 
assistance and protection, or because they themselves renounce the 
assistance and protection of the countries of which they are 
nationals.”411 
Additionally, both the Refugee Convention and the Refugee 
Act explicitly link the reason for why refugees cannot avail 
themselves of state protection to a well-founded fear of persecution. 
Where U.S law speaks of refugees as those who are “unable or 
unwilling to return to, and [are] unable or unwilling to avail 
[themselves] . . . of [state] protection . . . because of . . . a well-founded 
fear of persecution,” the Refugee Convention states that refugees are 
those who “owing to [a] well-founded fear of being persecuted . . . [are] 
unable or, owing to such fear . . . , unwilling to avail 
[themselves] . . . of [state] protection.”412 
The Board’s interpretations of the well-founded fear test 
create further parallels between these analyses. The Board has held 
that to establish a well-founded fear, an applicant must show, inter 
alia, that their feared persecutor is both able to harm them and 
inclined to harm them.413 In the context of nonstate persecutors, the 
question of whether a feared persecutor is able to harm necessarily 
turns upon the degree to which the state has both the will and 
capacity to protect. 
Given the tight link between the state protection and 
probability of harm analyses, the Refugee Act’s “unable 
or . . . unwilling to avail . . . of [state] protection” language must be 
understood consistently with the Supreme Court’s articulation of the 
well-founded fear test.414 Just as the Supreme Court did in Cardoza-
                                                            
411.  See GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 51, at 21 (citing A Study of 
Statelessness, supra note 57) (emphasis added). 
412 .  Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (emphasis added), with Refugee 
Convention, supra note 42, art. 1 (emphasis added). 
413.  Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439, 446 (B.I.A. 1987). 
414.     INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 437–38 (1987) (emphasis 
added) (citing IRO CONST., annex 1, pt. 1, § C1(a)(i)) (explaining that the “origin of 
the Protocol’s definition of ‘refugee,’” found in the 1946 [IRO] Constitution, 
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Fonseca, courts must examine “the plain language of the Act, its 
symmetry with the United Nations Protocol, and its legislative 
history.” 415  We believe when this analysis is properly conducted, 
effective state protection can only be measured by the degree to which 
it reduces a refugee’s probability of suffering future harm below the 
10% well-founded fear threshold. 416  Any other construction of the 
nonstate actor standard threatens to overtake the Supreme Court’s 
established interpretation of the reasonable possibility element of the 
refugee definition. 
The probability of future harm in any given case where there 
is a nonstate persecutor will depend on the level of state protection 
available. In this way, the two analyses are interconnected. Whereas 
the well-founded fear analysis looks at the ability and inclination of a 
persecutor to harm,417 the unable-or-unwilling standard looks at the 
ability and willingness of the state to protect. 418  The greater the 
degree to which the state is able and willing to protect, the lesser the 
probability of harm will be. Under this approach, the state protection 
analysis becomes a subcomponent of the well-founded fear analysis 
where the persecutor is a nonstate actor. To construe both statutory 
terms consistently, effectiveness of state protection must be measured 
within the context of the probability of harm.419 
In contrast, an elevated nonstate actor doctrine that requires 
an applicant to show more than a reasonable possibility of future 
harm is irreconcilable with the Refugee Convention and Refugee Act 
                                                                                                                                     
“defined a ‘refugee’” as one with a “‘valid objection’ to returning to his country,” 
and specified that “‘fear . . . of persecution . . . constituted a valid objection”); id. at 
439 (quoting the UNHCR Handbook’s proposition that “[in] general, the 
applicant’s fear should be considered well founded if he can establish, to a 
reasonable degree, that his continued stay in his country of origin has become 
intolerable to him for the reasons stated in the definition.”). 
415.  Id. at 449. 
416.     Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440 (“There is simply no room in 
the . . . definition for concluding that because an applicant only has a 10% chance 
of being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted, that he or she has no ‘well-
founded fear’ of the event happening.”). 
417.  Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. at 446. 
418.  Jimenez Galloso v. Barr, 954 F.3d 1189, 1192 (8th Cir. 2020). 
419.     Jimenez Galloso supports this argument by linking up the state 
protection analysis with the well-founded fear analysis. Id. (discussing whether 
petitioner had “established a well-founded fear of future persecution under the 
unable-and-unwilling standard”); accord Gathungu v. Holder, 725 F.3d 900, 909 
(8th Cir. 2013) (reasoning that where the Mungiki “will probably murder” 
applicant, the unwilling-or-unable standard is satisfied (citing Wanjiru v. Holder, 
705 F.3d 258, 260 (7th Cir. 2013))). 
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because it renders the “reasonable possibility” analysis superfluous. If 
the condone-or-completely-helpless standard can defeat the claim of 
someone who has established a well-founded fear of persecution 
where their country made some effort to protect420—and is therefore 
not completely helpless—then that standard is incongruous with the 
statute and thus cannot be afforded Chevron deference.421  
What should be beyond dispute is that the nonstate actor test 
cannot be viewed in isolation from the well-founded fear element of 
the refugee definition. Such an approach is foreclosed by the text of 
the statute.422 Longstanding cannons of statutory construction require 
that these elements be construed and understood consistently with 
one another.423 However, when the nonstate actor standard is linked 
to the term “persecution,” the connection to the probability of harm 
analysis is obscured to a degree that creates an opening for an 
elevated standard to take hold. 
                                                            
420.  This is precisely what the IJ in Jimenez Galloso did: even though he 
felt that the petitioner had met the standard for withholding of removal—a more 
likely than not probability of harm—he denied her relief because she could not 
show that Mexico was completely helpless in its struggle with domestic violence. 
See supra notes 318–22 and accompanying text. This approach was also 
apparently adopted in Matter of A-B- II, 28 I&N Dec. 199, 205 (A.G. 2021) 
(indicating adjudicators should not even focus “on whether government efforts to 
protect the applicant were effective,” as any state effort to protect demonstrates 
the government is not “completely helpless”). 
421.  The Second Circuit was critical of this argument in Scarlett, reasoning 
that it conflates the nonstate actor and well-founded fear requirements. Scarlett 
v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 332–33 (2d Cir. 2020). However, such a critique is 
misplaced. It should be beyond dispute that these two elements of the refugee 
definition must be understood consistently with one another. Yet if complete state 
helplessness carries the ordinary meaning those words suggest, then theoretically 
even a refugee facing a 90% probability of harm (in a country where the state 
protects just 10% of victims) could be denied asylum under that heightened 
standard because the state is not completely helpless. Such a complete helplessness 
rule nullifies the 10% probability of harm analysis where the feared persecutor is 
a nonstate actor. As such, that construction must be rejected for violating a 
cardinal rule of statutory interpretation. See Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 
543 (2015) (“We resist a reading of [the relevant statutory provision] that would 
render superfluous an entire provision passed in proximity as part of the same 
Act.”). 
422.  See supra note 414 and accompanying text. 
423.  FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) 
(holding that courts must “interpret the statute ‘as a symmetrical and coherent 
regulatory scheme’” (citing Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995), and 
“‘fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole’” (citing FTC v. Mandel 
Brothers, Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 (1959)). 
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C. Future Utility for the Term “Persecution”? 
As discussed at length above, the prevailing statutory hook 
used by both the agency and the courts for the unable-or-unwilling 
test has been the pre-defined nature of the term “persecution.”424 
Most courts have followed the lead of the BIA in using this rationale 
as the basis for the nonstate actor requirement, holding that 
“persecution” includes harm inflicted by a government or by nonstate 
actors the government is unable or unwilling to control.425 As this was 
the well-established understanding of the term before the passage of 
the Refugee Act, most courts have deferred to the agency’s 
determination that the standard was embedded within the term 
“persecution.” 
However, the risk in this approach—which Matter of A-B- I 
and its progeny have exposed—is that the term “persecution” also 
encompasses another component of the refugee definition: the 
severity of harm analysis.426 And courts have universally treated this 
term as ambiguous. 427  Thus, while the nonstate actor test is a 
                                                            
424.  See supra Section I.C. 
425.  See supra Section I.C. 
426.  See, e.g., Nelson v. INS, 232 F.3d 258, 263 (1st Cir. 2000) (“To qualify 
as persecution, a person’s experience must rise above unpleasantness, 
harassment, and even basic suffering.”); Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223, 226 
(2d. Cir. 2006) (finding that a “minor beating . . . may rise to the level of 
persecution if it occurred in the context of an arrest or detention”); Gomez-Zulaga 
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 342 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that brief detentions 
by armed guerillas where little physical harm occurs generally do not rise to the 
level of “persecution,” while an eight-day detention does); Li v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 
171, 178 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[E]conomic penalties rise to the level of persecution only 
if they are so harsh as to constitute a threat to life or liberty.”); Munoz-Granados 
v. Barr, 958 F.3d 402, 407 (5th Cir. 2020) (finding that indirect threats lacking in 
immediacy do not rise to the level of “persecution”); Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 
F.3d 384, 389–90 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that harassment or discrimination alone 
does not rise to the level of “persecution”); Stanojkova v. Holder, 645 F.3d 943, 
947–48 (7th Cir. 2011) (stating that, to constitute “persecution,” the harm must be 
more severe than discrimination or harassment); Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 
1011, 1014 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Economic discrimination has been held to rise to the 
level of persecution if such sanctions are sufficiently harsh to constitute a threat 
to life or freedom.”); Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1194 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(stating that, though single incidents of harm may not rise to the level of 
“persecution,” the cumulative effect of the harms may support an asylum claim); 
Witjaksano v. Holder, 573 F.3d 968, 977 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding that assaults 
that do not “requir[e] medical attention” do not rise to the level of persecution); 
Barrios-Bermudez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 322 F. App’x 787, 792 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(“[V]erbal harassment alone does not rise to the level of persecution.”). 
427.  See supra note 376. 
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separate and discrete element, courts are much more likely to defer to 
the agency’s construction of that test when it is framed as a 
subcomponent of the term “persecution.” Administrative law 
principles put those challenging the heightened standard at a distinct 
disadvantage if the terms of the debate center on the meaning of the 
word “persecution.”428 Additionally, as explicitly noted by Matter of  
A-B- II,429 an agency can depart from its past interpretations of an 
ambiguous statutory provision, even taking a 180 degree turn in 
positions, so long as that departure is explained.430 And courts will 
defer to even a reversed agency position, provided a rational reason 
can be conjured in its defense. 431  Consequently, we believe that 
continued use of the term “persecution” in this debate is imprudent, 
and likely to produce only diminishing returns at best. 
Nevertheless, there remain at least two possible additional 
arguments with regard to the term “persecution” that merit 
consideration. First, while the term “persecution” has been held to be 
ambiguous as it relates to the severity of harm,432 the term is not 
necessarily ambiguous in every respect.433 Specifically, as it relates to 
                                                            
428.  See, e.g., Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 233 (5th Cir. 2019) 
(rejecting a challenge to the condone-or-completely-helpless standard in part 
because the term “persecution” is ambiguous); Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 333 
(2d Cir. 2020) (same). Moreover, the nature of the debate regarding the meaning 
of the term “persecution” is only growing more challenging for refugees and their 
allies. On June 15, 2020, EOIR proposed a rule that would elevate the severity of 
harm threshold. Under the proposal: 
[P]ersecution would not include . . . : (1) Every instance of harm 
that arises generally out of civil, criminal, or military strife in a 
country . . . ; (2) any and all treatment that the United States 
regards as unfair, offensive, unjust, or even unlawful or 
unconstitutional . . . ; (3) intermittent harassment, including 
brief detentions; (4) repeated threats with no actions taken to 
carry out the threats; (5) non-severe economic harm or property 
damage; or (6) government laws or policies that are 
infrequently enforced, unless there is credible evidence that 
those laws or policies have been or would be applied to an 
applicant personally. 
See Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, supra note 4, at *36,280–
81. 
429.       Matter of A-B- II, 28 I&N Dec. 199, 213 (A.G. 2021). 
430.  See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 
U.S. 967, 981 (2005). 
431.  Id. 
432.  Corado v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 945, 947 (8th Cir. 2004). 
433.  Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. U.S. Env’tal Prot. Agency, 208 F.3d 
1047, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“A term may be ambiguous as applied to some 
situations, but not as applied to others.”); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 
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the unable-or-unwilling standard, at least two courts have been 
receptive to the argument that the canons of statutory construction 
demonstrate that the condone-or-completely-helpless language 
impermissibly conflicts with the statute’s language.434 Under their 
approach, there is no occasion for Chevron deference. 435  Second, 
following Grace, future scholarship and research could provide a 
stronger showing of an established and fully articulated nonstate 
actor requirement that existed prior to the passage of the Refugee Act 
to bolster the assertion that Congress was indeed aware of the 
doctrine and intended it to be carried forward by using that term in 
the Refugee Act. 
In any event, so long as the unable-or-unwilling standard is 
the product of the agency’s interpretation of the term “persecution,” it 
is vulnerable to reinterpretation and revision given Chevron and 
Brand X. Without conceding the point, we believe that a paradigm 
shift is needed to ground the nonstate actor standard in the more 
explicit statutory language that speaks of refugees as being “unable 
or unwilling to avail” themselves of state protection “because of a 
well-founded fear of persecution.” Not only does this language provide 
a firmer foundation for the unable-or-unwilling standard, it frames 
                                                                                                                                     
448 (1987) (noting that while “[t]here is obviously some ambiguity in a term like 
‘well-founded fear,’ which can only be given concrete meaning through a process of 
case-by-case adjudication,” the ordinary tools of statutory construction have a role 
to play in ruling out erroneous agency constructions of the term well-founded 
fear). 
434.  Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 130 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that 
“the Attorney General’s ‘condoned’ or ‘complete helplessness’ standard is not a 
permissible construction of the persecution requirement”); Juan Antonio v. Barr, 
959 F.3d 778, 795 (6th Cir. 2020) (reversing the Board’s conclusion because the 
“complete helplessness” standard is “‘not a permissible construction of the 
persecution requirement.’” (quoting Grace, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 130)); Jimenez 
Galloso v. Barr, 954 F.3d 1189, 1192 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing Miranda, 139 F.3d at 
627 (8th Cir. 1998)). In the Eighth Circuit, for example, Jimenez Galloso adopted 
this argument as it relates to the unable-or-unwilling standard existing within 
the predefined term “persecution.” However, it is noteworthy that the Eighth 
Circuit did not reach or discuss A-B- I even though both Ms. Jimenez Galloso and 
the government raised the issue. See Ellison & Gupta, supra note 34, at 1066–69. 
Given Jimenez Galloso’s silence on that issue, a future panel may well decide to 
defer to A-B-’s new construction of the nonstate actor standard. 
435.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842–43 (1984). For additional resources and arguments, see Practice Advisories 
Available for Domestic Violence and Children's Asylum Claims, CTR. FOR GENDER 
& REFUGEE STUDS., https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/article/practice-advisories-
available-domestic-violence-and-childrens-asylum-claims (on file with the 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review). 
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the standard in terms that help adjudicators measure the required 
level of effectiveness of state protection. As stated above, effective 
state protection can only be measured by the degree to which it 
reduces a refugee’s probability of suffering future harm below the 
10% well-founded fear threshold. 
D. Areas for Further Exploration 
This Section offers a few additional lines of inquiry to 
consider in pushing back against the heightened condone-or-
complete-helplessness standard for nonstate actor asylum claims. It 
does not purport to analyze these arguments exhaustively, but flags 
them for further scholarly exploration. In addition to considering the 
need for a symmetrical and coherent humanitarian framework—one 
that considers asylum, withholding, and protection under CAT 
alongside one another—this Section points to controlling law in the 
court of appeals related to intra-circuit conflicts as two additional 
strategies that merit some discussion. 
First, it is important that the standard for eligibility in the 
context of asylum and withholding be interpreted and construed 
consistently with the established standards for relief under CAT. Any 
requirement to show that one’s government “condones” their 
persecution by contrast elides the clearly established delineation 
between claims for relief under asylum and CAT. Courts have 
recognized that the CAT “consent or acquiescence” requirement is a 
more onerous one than the asylum nonstate actor standard. 436 
However, if applicants for asylum must prove their government 
condones or “enables” their persecution,437  the asylum standard is 
                                                            
436.  See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1) (2020) (“Torture is defined as any act by 
which severe pain or suffering . . . is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official . . . .”); Fuentes-Erazo v. Sessions, 848 
F.3d 847, 852 (8th Cir. 2017) (describing the “more onerous” CAT standard for 
government protection); Garcia v. Holder, 746 F.3d 869, 874 (8th Cir. 2014) 
(“Without more, the inability of Guatemalan police to curtail MS-13 violence does 
not entitle Somoza to CAT relief.” (emphasis added)); Mouawad v. Gonzales, 485 
F.3d 405, 413 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting that CAT imposes a higher standard than 
asylum for government protection). 
437.  Matter of A-B- I, 27 I&N Dec. 227, 316 (A.G. 2018); Matter of A-B- II, 
28 I&N Dec. 199, 204–05 (A.G. 2021) (stating that only where “the government in 
the home country has fallen so far short of adequate protection” as to “have some 
role in or responsibility for the ‘persecution’” can the condone-or-completely 
helpless test be met); id. at 206 (stating that “the inability [to protect]” should be 
tantamount to “a government . . . affirmatively persecuting its own citizens”).  
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effectively elevated above that of CAT.438 To the extent that Matter of 
A-B- I and II create a standard for asylum that exceeds even the 
standard for CAT, they violate the maxim that adjudicators must 
“interpret the statute ‘as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory 
scheme’ . . . and ‘fit . . . all parts into an harmonious whole.’”439 
Second, in circuit courts where both the condone-or-
completely-helpless and unable-or-unwilling standards have been 
used, there may be arguments related to resolving intra-circuit splits 
that provide additional fodder for resisting the condone-or-
completely-helpless test. Prior to Matter of A-B- I, the Fifth, Seventh, 
and Eighth Circuits had cited the two standards in the same decision 
without any apparent sense that the two standards differed.440 Where 
advocates can show that the two standards are actually inconsistent 
with one another, there is an opening that implicitly favors the older 
unable-or-unwilling standard. Most circuit courts have recognized 
that in the event of an intra-circuit conflict, the earliest-in-time rule 
should be used to choose between competing lines of cases.441 This 
strategy was successfully employed in Jimenez Galloso, where the 
court held that the older unable-or-unwilling standard controlled over 
the condone-or-completely-helpless standard. While this argument 
has yet to be raised in the Seventh Circuit, given the order in which 
the two standards were recognized there, this intra-circuit conflict 
approach would favor the unable-or-unwilling standard. 
Because the foregoing arguments largely fall outside the 
central statutory arguments advanced in this Article, this Section has 
only glancingly discussed them. Yet they deserve attention for further 
                                                            
438.     See, e.g., Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 509 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(“Acquiescence . . . does not require that the public official approve of the torture, 
even implicitly. It is sufficient that the public official be aware that 
torture . . . occurs and remain willfully blind to it.” (emphasis added)); 
Khrystotodorov v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that the standard 
for relief under CAT is more onerous than the standard for asylum). 
439.  See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 
(2000) (stating that the court must “interpret[] a statute to create a symmetrical 
and coherent regulatory scheme”); Matter of Khan, 26 I&N Dec. 797, 804 (B.I.A. 
2016) (disagreeing with the circuit court’s interpretation because it did not “result 
in a harmonious statutory scheme”). 
440.  Shehu v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 435, 437 (5th Cir. 2006); Galina v. INS, 
213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2000); Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 921 (8th 
Cir. 2005). 
441.     Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[I]n 
accordance with the almost universal practice in other federal circuits, . . . when 
faced with conflicting panel opinions, the earliest opinion must be followed ‘as it 
should have controlled the subsequent panels that created the conflict.’”). 
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scholarship and advocacy as part of the larger effort to resist 
application of any elevated nonstate actor standard.442 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to arguments made by both the government and 
counsel for many asylum applicants and to pronouncements in some 
circuit court decisions, the condone-or-complete-helplessness 
standard is clearly a heightened one for nonstate actor asylum 
claims. The unable-or-unwilling standard, which had been recognized 
for decades prior to the issuance of Matter of A-B- I, is the correct 
test. That standard is anchored in the plain language of the Refugee 
                                                            
442.  There is likewise a need to decide upon the standard of review of 
nonstate actor disputes before the BIA and the federal courts of appeals. Whether 
the undisputed facts of a case satisfy nonstate actor standard is a question of law 
that should receive de novo review. See Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 
1062, 1068 (2020) (holding that “the statutory phrase ‘questions of law’ includes 
the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts”); 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.1(d)(3) (providing that questions of law get de novo review). Both the Board 
and the Attorney General recently have lent support for this position. See, e.g., 
Matter of A-C-A-A-, 28 I&N Dec. 84, 84 (A.G. 2020) (“[T]he Board . . . must 
examine de novo whether the facts found by the IJ satisfy all of the statutory 
elements of asylum as a matter of law.” (emphasis added)); id. at 88 (describing 
the “elements” of an asylum claim to include, inter alia, whether “the alleged 
harm is inflicted by the government . . . or by persons the government is unwilling 
or unable to control”); Matter of R-A-F-, 27 I&N Dec. 778, 779 (A.G. 2020) 
(“Although the Board reviews an immigration judge’s factual findings for clear 
error, it reviews de novo ‘questions of law,’ . . . including the application of law to 
fact.”); Matter of Z-Z-O-, 26 I&N Dec. 586, 591 (B.I.A. 2015) (“[W]e will accept the 
underlying factual findings of the Immigration Judge unless they are clearly 
erroneous, and we will review de novo whether the underlying facts found by the 
Immigration Judge meet the legal requirements for relief from removal . . . .”). 
However, a number of courts have tended to review this issue under the 
deferential substantial evidence standard applied to factual disputes. See Portillo-
Flores v. Barr, 973 F.3d 230, 230 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding that “[w]hether a 
government is ‘unable or unwilling to control’ a private actor ‘is a factual 
question’” reviewed for substantial evidence), reh’g granted, 830 F. App’x 125 
(2020); Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1061 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(determining that the evidence was sufficient to conclude that the government 
was unwilling or unable to control a private actor). While clear error and 
substantial evidence would be the correct standards of review for disputes over 
the IJ’s factual findings, we contend that where the only question is whether the 
undisputed facts satisfy the nonstate actor test, that is a legal dispute and should 
be subject to the de novo standard of review. See e.g., Rosales Justo v. Sessions, 
895 F.3d 154, 162–163 (1st Cir. 2018) (“The BIA’s application of the ‘unwilling or 
unable’ standard is a legal question that we review de novo.”). The courts’ and 
agency’s lack of precision on this matter merit further scholarship. 
522 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [52.2 
Act and Refugee Convention. When correctly framed in its original 
context, the unable-or-unwilling test measures the effectiveness of 
state protection by the degree to which it reduces a refugee’s 
probability of future harm below the well-founded fear threshold. 
In addition to being rooted in the historical and textual 
analysis of the state protection component of the refugee framework, 
this Article’s arguments reflect the normative judgment that 
individuals facing a reasonable possibility of torture, death, or other 
serious harm deserve protection. Ineffective efforts on the part of a 
state to provide protection must not be used to send a bona fide 
refugee back into harm’s way. Such an outcome cannot be reconciled 
with the purpose or intent of the Refugee Act. Yet that is precisely 
what Matter of A-B- I and II do: their heightened nonstate actor 
standard functions to effectively eliminate asylum for many of the 
world’s most vulnerable refugees. When the state protection analysis 
is retooled and weaponized to defeat the claims of legitimate refugees 
facing a real risk of harm, it ceases to serve any purpose consonant 
with the Refugee Act or Refugee Convention. The time is thus ripe 
not only to relegate Matter of A-B- I and II to the jurisprudential 
dustbin, but also to properly ground the nonstate actor element in the 
text of the Refugee Act and thus provide a durable bulwark against 
future efforts to heighten the standard. 
 
